Of striking thoughts, § 1, 2. Of the modes of introducing them, 3-14. Various kinds and origins of them, 15-19. How they may be faulty, 20-24. Those are in error who study them too much, as well as those who utterly neglect them, 25-34. Transition to tropes, 35. 1. THE ancient Latins called whatever they conceived in the mind, sententia, "a thought." This acceptation of the word is not only very common among orators, but retains some hold of a place in the intercourse of ordinary life. For when we are going to take an oath, we speak ex animi nostri sententia, "from the thought of our mind," and when we congratulate our friends, we express ourselves ex sententia, "from our thought." Not unfrequently, however, they spoke of uttering their sensa; as to the word sensus, it seems to have applied by them only to the bodily senses. 2. But a custom has now become prevalent of calling the conceptions of the mind sensus, and those striking thoughts, which are introduced chiefly at the close of periods, sententiae. Such thoughts were far from being common among the ancients, but in our day are used to excess. I think it necessary for me, therefore, to say a few words concerning the different kinds of them, and the methods in which they may be used. 3. Though they all come under the same appellation, those that are properly called sententiae are the most ancient of their kind; the Greeks call them γνώμαι (gnōmai), and they received their name, both in Greek and Latin, from their similarity to counsels or decrees. The word is one of general meaning and reference; and a sententia may be deserving of praise in itself, without being applied to any particular subject. Sometimes it relates merely to a thing, as in "Nothing contributes so much to popularity as goodness"; sometimes to a person, as that saying of Domitius Afer, "A prince who would look into all things must of necessity overlook many things." 4. Some have called it a part of an enthymeme, and some the beginning or end of an epichireme; and it sometimes is so, but not always. It is remarked with more truth, that it is sometime simple, as in the two examples which I have just given sometimes accompanied with a reason, such as, "For in all disputes he that is the stronger, even though he receive the injury, appears, because his power is greater, to have inflicted it"; and sometimes double, as Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit, 5. Some have even made ten kinds, but in a way in which many more might be made, distinguishing them into sententia of interrogation, of comparison, of negation, of similitude, of admiration, etc.; for a thought might thus have a name from every form of language. One of the most remarkable kinds is that which consists in an opposition of particulars: Mors misera non est; aditus ad mortem est miser, 6. Sometimes thoughts are enunciated in a direct manner: Tam deest avaro quod habet, quàm quod non habet, but they receive additional force from a change in the form of expression; as, Usque adeòne mori miserum est? For this is more spirited than the direct expression, "Death is not grievous." The same effect may be produced by the adaptation of a general sentiment to a particular case; thus Medea in Ovid, instead of saying in a direct manner, Nocere facile est, prodesse difficile, "It is easy to do harm, difficult to do good," expresses herself with more animation thus: Servare potui: perdere ac possim rogas? 7. Thus Cicero makes a personal application of a common thought: "Your height of fortune, Caesar, carries with it nothing greater than the power, and nothing better than the will, to save as many persons as possible," attributing that to Caesar which belonged properly to the circumstances in which Caesar was placed. But in the use of such sentiments, we must take care, as we must indeed with regard to all thoughts, that they be not too frequently introduced, or be evidently inapplicable, (as is the case with many that are used by some speakers who call them καθολικά (catholica), and utter all that make for their cause as incontrovertible,) and that they be not employed everywhere, or put into the mouth of all characters indiscriminately. 8. For they are more suitable to persons of authority, whose character may give weight to what they say. Who indeed would listen patiently to a boy, or a young man, or a person of no estimation, if he spoke decisively, or uttered precepts with the air of a master? 9. Whatever we conceive in the mind, also, is an enthymeme, but that which is properly called so, consists of two thoughts in opposition, because it seems to be as pre-eminent among other thoughts as Homer among poets and Rome among cities. Of this enough has been said in the part where I spoke of arguments. 10. It is not, however, always used for the purpose of argument, but sometimes merely for embellishment, as, "Shall the language of those, Caesar, whose impunity is an honor to your clemency, incite you to cruelty?" Cicero adds this question, not because it contains a new reason, but because it had been already shown, by other arguments, how unjust such conduct would be; 11. and it is subjoined at the close of the period by way of epiphonema, not as a proof, but as a triumphant blow to the adverse party; an epiphonema being, as it were, the concluding attestation to something already related or proved; as in Virgil, Tantae molis erat Romanam condere gentem, Or as in the words of Cicero, "The young man, being of honorable disposition, chose rather to incur danger, than to endure what was disgraceful." 12. There is also to be noticed what is called by the moderns νόημα (noēma, a term which may be taken as implying any thought whatever; but our rhetoricians have distinguished by it that which they do not express, but wish to be understood; as in what was said to the young man, whom his sister had several times redeemed when he had enlisted among the gladiators, and who brought an action against her under the lex talionis, because she had cut off his thumb while he was asleep, "You deserved," exclaimed she, "to have your hand whole," intimating that he deserved to be all his life a gladiator. 13. What is called a clausula, too, requires to be mentioned; and if it be in the sense of what we term a conclusion, it is proper, and, in some places, necessary; as, "You must, therefore, make confession concerning your own conduct, before you blame anything in that of Ligarius." But our modern speakers use it in another sense, and intimate that every thought at the conclusion of a period should fall pointedly on the ear. 14. They think it unbecoming, and almost a crime, to take breath at any passage which is not intended to call forth acclamations. Hence those small witticisms, uttered in bad taste, and forced into the service of the subject; for there cannot be as many happy thoughts as there must be conclusions to periods. 15. The following kinds of sententiae among the moderns may also be noticed. That which consists in something unexpected; as the retort of Vibius Crispus to a man who, when he was walking about the forum in a coat of mail, pretended that he did so from fear: "Who," exclaimed Crispus, "has given you permission to be so much in fear?" Or as the remarkable address of Africanus to Nero on the death of his mother, "Your Gallic provinces, Caesar, entreat you to bear your good fortune with firmness." 16. Others consist in some indirect allusion; as, when Domitius Afer was pleading for Cloantilla, whom Claudius had pardoned when she was accused of having buried her husband, who had been killed among the rebels, he remarked in his peroration, addressing himself to her sons, "Nevertheless, young men, do not fail to bury your mother." 17. Some are aliunde petita, that is, transferred from one thing to another; as Crispus, in pleading for Spatale, whose lover, after making her his heiress, had died at the age of twenty-two, exclaimed, "O youth of extraordinary forethought, who thus gratified himself!" 18. Mere repetition makes some of these sententiae, as that of Seneca in the letter which Nero sent to the senate after killing his mother, wishing to make it appear that he had been in great danger, "That I am safe, neither, as yet, do I believe, nor do I rejoice." But this is better when it is strengthened by an opposition of clauses, as, "I know where to flee, but whom to follow I do not know. Why need I add that the miserable man, though he could not speak, could not hold his peace?" 19. It is most striking, however, when it is vivified by some comparison, as in the remark of Trachalus against Spatale, "Do you desire, therefore, O ye laws, most faithful guardians of chastity that tenth parts of estates should be awarded to wives, and fourth parts to mistresses?" Of such kinds of sententiae, however, some may deserve to be called good, and some bad. 20. Those are always bad that are mere plays on words, as, "Conscript Fathers, for I must commence thus, to remind you of what is due to fathers." A still worse kind, as it is more false and far-fetched, is such as that which was attributed to the gladiator, (whom I mentioned just above,) as a retort to his sister, "I have fought to my finger." 21. But perhaps the most execrable of all is when ambiguity in the words is joined with something that conveys a false notion as to the matter. I remember, when I was a young man, hearing a famous pleader, who had given a mother some splinters of bone, picked out of a wound in her son's head, merely for the sake of a sententia, exclaim, "Unhappy woman, you have not yet conveyed your son to his funeral pile, and yet you have collected his bones." 22. Thus many delight even in the pettiest attempts at wit, which, if examined, are merely ridiculous, but which, when first produced, please the hearer with a show of ingenuity. For example, there is an imaginary case in the schools of a man who, having been shipwrecked, after being previously ruined by the barrenness of his grounds, hanged himself; and it is said of him, "Let him whom neither earth nor sea sustains, hang in the air." 23. A similar witticism was made on the young man that I mentioned above, to whom, when he was tearing his flesh, his father gave poison: "He who eats that, ought to drink this." To a luxurious man, also, who is said to have pretended a resolution to die by hunger, the admonition was offered, "Make a rope for yourself; you have reason to be angry with your throat; or take poison; a toper ought to die drinking." 24. Some are mere inanity, as that of the declaimer extorting the generals of Alexander to bury him in the ashes of Babylon, and exclaiming, "I celebrate the obsequies of Alexander, and will any one behold them from the window of his house?" as if the absence of spectators from windows were more to be deplored than anything else relating to the ceremony. Some are extravagant; as what I heard a speaker say of the Germans, "I know not where their head is placed," and of a brave man, "He repelled wars with his shield." 25. But there would be no end, if I were to attempt to enumerate all the species of tasteless witticisms. Let us rather attend to a point which is of more importance. There are two different opinions respecting sententiae; that of those who set the highest value on them; and that of those who entirely reject them. With neither of these opinions do I exactly concur. 26. If brilliant thoughts are too crowded, they interfere one with another; as in crops of corn, and fruits on trees, nothing can grow to its just size that wants space in which to expand itself. Nor does a figure in a picture, which has no shade surrounding it, stand out in relief; and accordingly painters, when they combine several objects in the same piece, keep them distinct by intervening spaces, that shadows may not fall on the objects. 27. This pursuit of fine thoughts, also, makes style too curt; for every thought makes as it were a stand, as being complete in itself; and after it there must necessarily be the commencement of another sentence. Hence language is rendered too unconnected, and being composed, not of members, but of bits, has no proper construction; for these round and polished portions refuse to unite with each other. 28. The complexion, too, of the style, is variegated with spots, which, however brilliant, are of many and diverse hues; and, although a band and decorations of purple, put on a dress in their proper place, give a radiance to it, yet certainly a garment bedecked with various patches would be becoming to nobody. 29. However, therefore, such ornaments may seem to glitter and stand out, as it were, in composition, yet we may well compare them, not to the light of flame, but to sparks appearing among smoke; for they would not be noticed if the whole composition were luminous, any more than the stars are seen in the light of the sun; and the eloquence that tries to raise itself, as it were, with frequent little bounds, presents an unequal and broken surface to the view, neither gaining the admiration paid to lofty objects, nor exhibiting the attractions of level ground. 30. To this is to be added another evil, that the speaker who is always hunting for striking thoughts, must necessarily produce many that are trifling, vapid, and impertinent; for he can make no proper distinction where he is overwhelmed with numbers. Hence you may witness, among such orators, even the division of their subject set off with the air of a fine thought, as well as their arguments, if they be delivered at the close and fall of a period. 31. "You, yourself an adulterer, have killed your wife; I could not have tolerated your conduct, even if you had but divorced her," is with them a mode of division, and, "Would you be convinced that the philtre was poison? The man would be now alive, if he had not drunk it," is a form of argument. Most of them, indeed, may be said not to utter fine thoughts, but to utter everything as if it were a fine thought. 32. Some, again, make the contrary practice their study, shunning and shrinking from all such charms of composition, and approving nothing but what is plain, and humble, and without effort. Thus, while they are afraid that they may sometimes fall, they are always creeping on the ground. But what crime do they suppose that there is in producing a fine thought? Does it not strike the judge? Does it not recommend the speaker? 33. It is a fashion of speaking, they reply, which the orators of antiquity did not follow. How far back in antiquity, let me ask them, do they refer us? If to a remote period, Demosthenes produced many fine thoughts, such as no one had produced before him. If to a more recent period, how, let me ask, can they approve even Cicero, when they think that there ought to be no deviation from the manner of Cato and the Gracchi? Before the Cato and the Gracchi, too, there was a still plainer way of speaking. 34. For my own part, I consider such ornaments of style to be the very eyes, as it were, of eloquence; but I should not wish eyes to be spread over the whole body, lest other members should be obstructed in their functions; and, if I were compelled to make a choice, I should prefer the rudeness of the ancients to the affectation of the moderns. But a middle course is open between them; as, in our mode of living and dress, a certain elegance may be observed which is free from blame. Let us add, therefore, as far as we can, to the merits of our style; but let it be our first care to avoid faults, lest, while we wish to be better than the ancients, we make ourselves merely unlike them. 35. I shall now proceed to the consideration of tropes, which I mentioned as the next head of my subject. The illustrious orators of our times call them motus, "movements" or "changes." Rules concerning them the grammarians generally deliver, but when I was speaking of their duties, I delayed entering on this head, because, as it refers to the embellishment of style, it seemed to me that it would demand more attention and should be reserved for a more important place in my work.
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