Of definition; it has something in common with conjecture and quality, § 1, 2. Various reasons why it is used, 3-7. Three species of it, 8-11. Other diversities, more suited to philosophical discussions than to the business of the orator, 12-16. We must beware of defining too subtilely, 17, 18. Method in definition, 19-22. How a definition is overthrown, 23-27. A general definition may be adapted to our own cause, 28-34. Some concluding remarks, 35, 36. 1. NEXT to conjecture regarding a fact comes the definition of it, for he who is unable to prove that he has done nothing will try, in the next place, to make it appear that he has not done that which is laid to his charge. Definition is accordingly managed, for the most part, by the same methods as conjecture, the kind of defense only being changed, as we may see in cases of theft, deposits, or adultery; for as we say, I have not been guilty of theft, I did not receive a deposit, I have not committed adultery, so we say, what I did is not theft, what I received was not a deposit, what I committed is not adultery. 2. Sometimes we proceed from quality to definition as in actions regarding madness, bad treatment of a wife, and offences against the state, in which, if it cannot be said that what is laid to the charge of the accused was rightly done, it remains to say, that to act thus is not to be mad, to treat a wife ill, to injure the state. Definition, then, is an explication of something in question, proper, clear, and concisely expressed. 3. It consists chiefly, as has been said, in the notification of genus, species, differences, and peculiarities; as, to define a horse (for I shall adopt a well known example), the genus is animal, the species mortal, the difference irrational (for man is also a mortal animal,) and the peculiarity neighing. 4. Definition is frequently used in pleading causes, for many reasons; for sometimes parties are agreed upon the term, but differ as to what is to be included under it; and sometimes the thing is clear, but there is a doubt as to the term to be applied to it. When there is an agreement about the name, and a doubt about the thing the decision sometimes depends upon conjecture; as when it is asked, what is God? 5. For he who denies that God is a spirit, diffused through every part of the universe, does not say that the term divine is improperly applied to his nature, like Epicurus, who has given him a human form, and a place in the spaces between the worlds. Both use one term, but are in doubt which of the two natures is consistent with the reality. 6. Sometimes it is quality that is to be considered, as, What is oratory? is it the power of persuading, or the art of speaking well? This kind of question is very common in civil causes; thus it is inquired, whether a man found with another man's wife in a brothel is an adulterer? because the question is not about the name, but the quality of the act, and whether the man has been guilty of any offense at all; for if he has committed any, offense, he can be nothing else but an adulterer. 7. It is a definition of a quite different kind when the question is wholly about a term, the application of which depends on the letter of the law, and which would not be discussed in a court of justice, but for the words which give rise to the dispute. Thus it is inquired, whether he who kills himself is a murderer; whether he who forced a tyrant to kill himself is a tyrannicide; and whether the incantations of magicians are poisons; for about the thing, itself there is no controversy, as it is known to all men that it is not the same to kill one's self as to kill another, to kill a tyrant as to drive him to suicide, to recite incantations as to administer a draught of poison, but it is a question whether they do not, respectively, come under the same denomination. 8. Though I hardly dare to dissent from Cicero, who, following many authorities, says that definition is always concerned about a thing itself and something else, (as he that denies that a certain term is applicable to a certain thing, is obliged to show what term would be more applicable,) yet I consider that there are, as it were, three species of it. 9. For sometimes it is convenient to put a question thus: Is that adultery which is committed in a brothel? When we deny that it is adultery, it is not necessary to show by what term it ought to be called, for we deny the whole charge. Sometimes the inquiry is made thus: Is this act theft or sacrilege? Not but that it is sufficient for the defense that it is not sacrilege; still it is necessary to show what else it is: and consequently both theft and sacrilege must be defined. 10. Sometimes, again, it is a question with regard to things of different species, whether one can come under the same denomination as the other, when each has its own proper appellation as a philtre, and a dose of poison, But in all disputes of this kind the question is whether this also comes under the same term, because the term, about which the dispute is, is acknowledged to be applicable to something else. It is sacrilege to steal what is sacred from a temple; is it also sacrilege to steal from it private property? It is adultery to lie with another man's wife in her own house; is it also adultery to lie with her in a brothel? It is tyrannicide to kill a tyrant; is it also tyrannicide to drive a tyrant to kill himself? 11 . Accordingly syllogism, of which I shall speak hereafter, is, as it were, a weaker kind of definition; because in the one, it is inquired whether the same term is applicable to the thing, in question as is applicable to something else; and, in the other, whether one thing is not to be reasoned about in the same manner as another. 12. There is also so much difference in definitions, that it is doubtful, as some think, whether the same thing can be defined in more than one form of words: as, whether rhetoric can be defined not only as the art of speaking well, but also as that of conceiving and expressing thoughts well, and of speaking with the full force of language, and of saying what is to the purpose. Yet we must take care that different definitions, though not at variance in sense, be expressed in a different form of words. But this is a subject for discussion among philosophers, not in courts of justice. 13. Sometimes words that are obscure, and but little known, require definition, as clarigatio, proletarius. Sometimes also words that are well known in common speech, as what is the exact meaning of penus, "provisions," and litus, "a shore." This variety is the reason that some authors include definition in the state of conjecture, others in that of quality; others even rank it among legal questions. 14. Some have not been at all pleased with that subtilty of definition which is adapted to the manner of logicians, thinking it rather fitted for cavilling about the niceties of words in the discussions of philosophers than likely to be of any service in the pleadings of orators. For though, they say, definition is of avail, in discussion, to hold in its fetters him who has to reply, and to force him to be silent, or to admit, even against his will, that which is to his prejudice, yet it is not of the same use in legal arguments; for in them we have to persuade the judge, who, though he may be fettered by our words, will yet, unless he is satisfied with our matter, mentally dissent from us altogether. 15. What great necessity, indeed, has a pleader of such preciseness of definition? If I do not say Man is an animal mortal and rational, can I not, by setting forth his numerous qualities of body and mind, in words of a wider scope, distinguish him from the gods or from brutes? 16. Is it not generally allowed, too, that one thing may be defined in more ways than one, (as Cicero shows, in saying, quid enim vulgo? universos, "for what are we to understand by publicly? All men,") and with a freedom and variety of manner, such as all orators have ordinarily adopted? Since, assuredly, the slavery of binding ourselves to certain words, (for slavery it indisputably is,) which has its origin in the practice of the philosophers, is very seldom to be seen in them; and Marcus Antonius, in the books of Cicero de Oratore, expressly cautions us against attempting such exactness; 17. for it is even dangerous, since, if we err but in one word, we are likely to lose our cause entirely; and the best course is that middle one which Cicero adopts in his oration for Caecina, and in which things are set forth, but exactness of terms is not hazarded. For, says he, judges, that is not the only kind of violence which is offered to our persons and our lives, but there is a far more atrocious kind of violence, which, threatening us with the peril of death, often unsettles the mind, alarmed with terror, from its proper state and condition. 18. Or we may be secure, I may add, by letting proof precede definition; as when Cicero, in his Philippics, first establishes that Servius Sulpicius was killed by Antony, and then, in conclusion, defines thus: for he certainly killed who was the cause of death. I would not deny, however, that such rules are to be observed in pleading only as far as they are serviceable for our cause; and that if a definition can be made, at once strong, and expressed in a concise form of words, it is not only an ornament to our speech, but has very great effect, provided that it be impregnable. 19. The invariable order in definition is what a thing is, and whether it is this; and in general there is more difficulty in establishing the definition than in applying it to the matter in hand. As to the first point, what a thing is, there are two objects to he regarded; for our own definition is to be established, and that of the opposite party is to be overthrown, 20. Hence in the schools, where we imagine contradiction offered to us, we have to lay down two definitions as exact as is possible for each party. But what we have to observe in the forum is, that our definition be not, possibly, superabundant, or nothing to the purpose, or ambiguous, or inconsistent, or equally favourable to both sides; faults that cannot happen except through the unskilfulness of the pleader. 21. But, if we would define accurately, we shall be likely best to effect our object, if we first settle in our mind what we wish to establish; for our words will thus be exactly suited to our purpose. That this point may be the clearer, let us still adhere to our familiar example: A man who has stolen private property from a temple, is accused of sacrilege. 22. The fact is not disputed; the question is, whether the term sacrilege, which is in the law, is applicable to the offense. It is accordingly disputed whether the act is sacrilege. The prosecutor adopts the term, because the money was stolen from a temple; the defendant denies that it is sacrilege, because he stole private property, but admits that it was theft. The advocate of the prosecutor, therefore, will define thus, It is sacrilege to steal anything from a sacred place; while the advocate of the defendant will define in this way, It is sacrilege to steal anything sacred. 23. Each, too will try to overthrow the definition of the other; and a definition is overthrown in two ways, by being proved to be false or incomplete. It may indeed have a third fault, that of having no relation to the matter under consideration, but it will hardly be made faulty in this respect, except by fools. 24. We make a false definition, if we say, A horse is a rational animal; for a horse is indeed an animal, but irrational. That, again, which is common to anything else, will not be peculiar to the thing defined. Thus, then, the accused will say that the definition of the accuser is false; while the accuser cannot say that that of the accused is false; for it is sacrilege to steal anything sacred; but he will say that it is incomplete, since he ought to have added, or from a sacred place. 25. But for establishing and overthrowing definitions, one of the most effective modes is to have recourse to the consideration of peculiarities and differences, and sometimes also to etymology. All these particulars equity, as in other matters, will assist to support, and sometimes, also, conjecture. Etymology is but rarely introduced. We have one example of it in Cicero: For what is a tumult, but such a perturbation that greater fear (timor) arises (whence also the term tumult is derived)?. 26. But about peculiarities and differences great subtility is displayed; as when it is inquired whether an addictus, whom the law condemns to serve until he pays his debts, is a slave. The one party will define thus: He is a slave who is legally in slavery; the other: He is a slave who is in slavery under the same legal conditions as a slave; or, as the ancients said, qui servitutem servit, "who serves as a slave." Yet this last definition, though it differs somewhat from the other, is feeble, unless it be supported by the aid of peculiarities and differences; for the opponent will say that the addictus does serve as a slave, or under the same legal condition as a slave. 27. Let us look, then, to the peculiarities and differences on which I touched lightly, in passing, in the fifth book: A slave, when he is set free, becomes a freedman; an addictus, when he recovers his liberty, is ingenuus; a slave cannot obtain his liberty without the consent of his master; a slave has no benefit of law; an addictus has what is peculiar to a freeman, is that which no one has who is not free, as a pronomen, nomen, cognomen, and tribe; and these an addictus has. 28. When it is decided what a thing is, the question, whether it is this, is almost settled. However, we have to take care that our definition be favourable to our own cause. But what is most influential in a definition is the question of quality, as whether love be madness? To this question belong such proofs as Cicero says are proper to definition; proofs from antecedents, consequents, adjuncts, contraries, causes, effects, similitudes; of the nature of which arguments I have already spoken. 29. Cicero, in his speech for Caecina, gives a concise example of arguments from beginnings, causes, effects, antecedents, consequents: Why then did they flee? For fear. What did they fear? Violence, doubtless. Can you then deny the beginning, when you have admitted the end? He has also recourse to similitude: Shall not that which is called violence in war, be called by the same name in peace? 30. But arguments are also drawn from contraries; for instance, if it be inquired whether a philtre be poison or not, because poison is not a philtre. That the other kind of definition may be better known to my young men, (for I shall always think them my young men,) I shall here give an example of a fictitious case. 31. Some youths, who were in the habit of associating together, agreed to dine on the sea-shore. One of them being absent from the dinner, the others erected a sort of tomb to him, and inscribed his name upon it. His father returning from a voyage across the sea, landed at that part of the coast, and, on reading his son's name, hanged himself. 32. These youths are said to have been the cause of the father's death. The definition of the accuser will be, He that commits any act that leads to the death of another, is the cause of the other's death. That of the accused will be, He who knowingly commits any act by which the death of another must necessarily be caused, etc. But setting aside definition, it is enough for the accuser to say, You were the cause of the man's death; for it was through your act that he died, since, if you had not acted as you did, he would now be alive. 33. To this the advocate of the accused will reply, He by whose act the death of a person has been caused, is not necessarily to be condemned for it; else what would become of accusers, witnesses, and judges, in cases of life and death? Nor is there always guilt in the person from whom the cause proceeded; for instance, if a person recommends a voyage to another, or invites a friend from over the sea, and he perishes by shipwreck, or if he invites a person to supper, and he dies of a surfeit committed at it, would he be guilty of the death of any of those persons? 34. Nor was the act of the young men the sole cause of death, but also the credulity of the old man, and his weakness in enduring affliction; for if he had had more fortitude or wisdom, he would be still living. Nor did the young men act with any bad intentions; and he might have judged, either from the place of the supposed tomb, or from the marks of haste in its construction, that it was no real sepulchre. How then ought they to be punished, who, though they may seem to be homicides in every other respect, are evidently not so in intention? 35. Sometimes there is a settled definition, in which both parties agree. Thus Cicero says, Majesty resides in the government and in the whole dignity of the Roman people. But it may sometimes be a question whether this majesty has been injured, as was the case in the cause of Cornelius. 36. But even if such a cause be thought similar to one dependent on definition, yet, as there is no dispute in it about definition, the point for decision must be one of quality, and must be included in that state which we happen to have had occasion to mention. It was however the subject next in order.
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