Affinity between different positions, § 1-4. Some precepts with regard to causes can be given only when the causes themselves are stated, 5-7. Impossible to give instruction on every particular point, 8, 9. Many things the student must teach himself, and must depend for success on his own efforts, 10-17. 1. THERE is a certain affinity between the positions, for in definition the question is what is the meaning of a term. In the syllogism, which is most nearly related to definition, the object is to ascertain what the writer meant, and from antinomia, or the contradiction of laws, it appears that there are two positions of writing and intention of the writer. Definition, again, is itself a kind of ambiguity, as the meaning of a word may be regarded in two lights. 2. The position of what is written and the intention of the writer has regard also to the signification of terms, and the same object is kept in view in antinomia. Hence some rhetoricians have said that all these positions merely constitute that of letter and intention; others think that in that of letter and intention lies the ambiguity which gives rise to dispute. But all these positions are in reality distinct, for an obscure law is one thing, and an ambiguous law another. 3. Definition is concerned with a general question (which can be unconnected with the scope of a cause) regarding the nature of a term. The position of letter and intention discusses the meaning of the very word which is in the law, while syllogism tries to settle what is not in the law. Ambiguity considers a word under two senses, whereas antinomia is a comparison between two contradictory laws. 4. This distinction, accordingly, has been justly admitted by the most learned rhetoricians and continues to be observed among the generality of the wisest. Though it is not possible to give directions on all points of discussions of this kind, it has been practicable to give some. 5. There are other particulars which allow facility for instruction only when the subject on which we have to speak is propounded, for not only must a whole cause be divided into its general questions and heads, but these divisions themselves must also have their own distribution and arrangement of matter. In the exordium there is something first, something second, and so on, and every question and head must have its own disposition of particulars, like single theses. 6. For example, supposed that a speaker divides his case into these points: "whether every kind of reward ought to be granted to the deliverer of his country; whether he should be permitted to take private property; whether a marriage with whom he pleases should be allowed him; whether a married lady should be given him; and whether to the lady whose case is before the court." Is it possible that he can be thought sufficiently skilled in arrangement if, when speaks before the court on the first point, he mixes up his observations indiscriminately, just as each happens to come into his head, not knowing that he should consider first whether we should hold to the letter of a law or to the intent of it? Or if he should make a commencement on this question, and then, connecting with it what follows, should arrange the whole of his speech with the same regularity as the parts of the human body, of which, for example, the hand is a portion, the fingers a portion of the hand, and the joints portions of the finger? 7. It is this nicety of arrangement that a writer on rhetoric cannot teach unless he has a certain and definite subject before him. 8. But what would one or two examples avail, or even a hundred or a thousand, in a field that is boundless? It is the part of a teacher to demonstrate day after day, sometimes in one kind of cause and sometimes in another, what is the proper order and connection of particulars so that skill and the power of application to similar cases may gradually be acquired by his pupils. 9. All cannot be taught that art is able to accomplish. What painter has learned to copy every object on the face of the earth? But when he has once acquired skill in copying, he will produce a representation of whatever he takes in hand. What artist in fashioning vases has not produced one such as he had never seen? Some things, however, depend not on the teachers, but on the learners. 10. A physician will teach his pupil what is to be done in every sort of disease, and what is to be conjectured from certain symptoms, but it is the pupil's own genius that must acquire for him the nice faculty of feeling the pulse, of observing the different degrees of heat, and the alterations in respiration and complexion, and of noting what tokens are significant of any particular malady. In like manner, let us seek most aid from ourselves and meditate our own causes, reflecting that men discovered the art of orator before they taught it. 11. For that is the most effective arrangement of a pleading, an arrangement justly called economie, which cannot be made but when the whole cause is spread as it were before us, and which tells us when we ought to adopt an exordium and when to omit it; when we should make a continuous statement of a case and when a statement subdivided into heads; when we should begin at the beginning and when, after the manner of Homert in the middle or towards the end; 12. when we should make no statement at all; when we should commence with our own allegations and when with those of our adversary; when with the strongest proofs, when with the weaker; in what sort of cause questions should be propounded in the introduction; in what causes the way should be prepared for them by prefatory hints; what the mind of the judge will be likely to admit if expressed at once, and to what he must be conducted gradually; whether our refutation should oppose the arguments of the adversary one by one, or in a body; whether our appeals to the feelings should be reserved for the peroration, or diffused through our whole speech; whether we should speak first of law or of equity; whether we should first charge our opponent with past opulences or repel them if advanced against ourselves or confine our remarks to the points for decision; 13. and, if a cause be complex, what order should be observed in our conduct of it, and what oral or written evidence, of any kind, should be set forth in our regular pleading, or reserved. This is the virtue, as it were, of a general dividing his forces to meet the various events of war, retaining part to garrison fortresses or to defend cities, and distributing other parts to collect provisions, to secure passes, and to act by land or by sea, as occasion may require. 14. But in oratory, such merits will only be displayed to he whom all the resources of nature, learning, and industry shall be at hand. Let no man expect, therefore, to be eloquent only by the labor of others. Let him who would be an orator be assured that he must study early and late; that he must reiterate his efforts; that he must grow pale with toil; he must exert his own powers and acquire his own method. He must not merely look to principles, but must have them in readiness to act upon them, not as if they had been taught him, but as if they had been born in him. 15. For art can easily show a way, if there be one, but art has done its duty when it sets the resources of eloquence before us. It is for us to know how to use them. 16. There remains then only the arrangement of parts, and in the parts themselves there must be some one thought first, another second, another third, and so on. We must take care that these thoughts are not merely placed in a certain order, but that they are also connected one with another, cohering so closely that no joining may appear between them, so that they may form a body and not a mere collection of members. 17. This object will be attained if we take care to observe what is suitable for each place and study to bring together words that will not combat but embrace each other. Thus different things will not seem hurried together from distant parts, all strangers one to another, but will unite themselve in a sure bond and alliance with those that precede and those that follow; and our speech will appear not merely a combination of phrases, but all of a piece. But I am perhaps proceeding too far, as the transition from one part to another beguiles me, and I am gliding imperceptibly from the rules for arrangement into those for elocution, on which the next book shall formally enter.
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