 |
Book 6 - Chapter 5
|
 |
Of judgment and sagacity; their importance, § 1-6. Examples from Demosthenes, 7, 8. From Cicero, 9, 10. Conclusion of the book, 11.
1. HAVING treated of this head to the best of my ability, I should not hesitate to pass at once to disposition, which follows next in order, were I not apprehensive that, as there are writers who place judgment under invention, I might be thought by some to have purposely omitted that subject, though it is a quality, in my opinion, so blended and mixed with every part of oratory that its influence is inseparable from even a single thought or word; and it is not communicable by art any more than taste or smell. 2. All that I can do, accordingly, is to teach and persevere in teaching what is to be imitated or avoided in each department of the art in order that judgment may be exercised in reference to it. I shall continue to teach, therefore, that we must not attempt what cannot be accomplished, that we must avoid all arguments that are contradictory or common to both sides, and that nothing in our speech must be barbarous or obscure. The observance of all such rules must be under the guidance of common sense, which cannot be taught.
3. From judgment I do not consider that sagacity greatly differs, except that judgment is employed about things which are evident in themselves, and sagacity about things that are obscure, having either not been noticed at all or being of a doubtful nature. Judgment is very often sure; sagacity is a certain reasoning, as it were, from the depths of things, generally weighing and comparing different arguments and exercising the faculties both of invention and arbitration. 4. But such observations are not to be taken as universally true, for sagacity is often exercised on some circumstance that precedes the pleading of a cause. As example, in pleading against Verres, Cicero appears with great sagacity to have preferred occupying shorter time with his speech to prolonging it to the year in which Quintus Hortensius was to be consul. 5. In the conduct of a pleading, sagacity holds the first and most influential place, for it is required to determine what we ought to say, what to suppress, and what to defer; whether it be better to deny a fact, or to justify it; when we should use an exordium and of what kind; whether we should give a statement of facts and in what form; whether we should rest our case on law or on equity; what order is the most eligible; and what style we should adopt and whether it be expedient to speak boldy, gently, or humbly. 6. But upon these points I have already, as occasion has allowed, given some directions, and I shall continue to do so in the rest of my work. I will make a few remarks here, however, by way of example, that it may be more clearly understood what it is that I think cannot be taught by rules of art. 7. The sagacity of Demosthenes is commended in this respect, that when he was recommending war to the Athenians, who had previously tried it with little success, he showed that nothing had been done in it with prudent management, so their neglect might be made amends for, whereas if no error had been committed, there would have been no ground for better hopes for the future. 8. The same orator, too, when he feared to give offense if he reproached the people for their indolence in maintaining the liberty of their country, preferred to dwell on the praise of their ancestors, who had governed it with such effect. For he thus found them willing to listen, and it naturally followed that while they approved of the better, they repented of the worse. 9. As to Cicero, his speech for Cluentius alone is worth an infinity of examples. For what proof of sagacity in it shall I admire most? The opening of the case, in which he deprives the mother, whose influence bore hard upon her son of all credit? Or his determination to transfer the guilt of having bribed the judges on the adverse party, rather than deny it, on account, as he says, of the notorious infamy of their judgment? Or last of all, his recourse in so odious an affair to the support of the law, a mode of defense by which he would have alienated the feelings of the judges, if they had not been previously softened? Or his protestation that he adopted that course contrary to the inclination of Cluentius? 10. Or what shall I commend in his speech for Milo? That he made no statement of the case until he had removed the prejudices entertained against the accused? That he threw the odium of having lain in wait upon Clodius, though the encounter was in reality fortuitous? That he commended the deed, and yet exculpates Milo from having intentionally committed it? That he put no supplications into the mouth of his client, but took the character of suppliant on himself? It would be endless to enumerate all the proofs of sagacity that he exhibits: how he divests Cotta of all credit; how he opposes himself in the place of Ligarius; how he rescues Cornelius by alleging the openness of his confession. 11. I think it sufficient to observe that there is nothing, not only in oratory, but in the whole conduct of life, more valuable than sagacity. Without it all, instruction is given in vain, and judgment can do more without learning than learning without judgment, for it is the part of that virtue to adapt our speech to places, circumstances, and characters. But as this part of my subject is somewhat comprehensive and is intimately connected with oratorical effect, it shall be noticed when I proceed to give directions on speaking with propriety.
|
