Of the power of exciting laughter in an audience, § 1. There was little of it in Demosthenes; perhaps a superabundance of it in Cicero, 2-5. Causes of laughter not sufficiently explained, 6, 7. Is of great effect, 8-10. Depends far more on nature and favorable circumstances than on art, 11-13. No instructions given in exciting laughter, 14-16. Various names for jocularity or wit, 17-21. Depends partly on matter, partly on words; subjects of it, 22-24. Laughter may be excited by some act, or look, or gesture, 25-27. What is becoming to the orator, 28-32. What to be avoided by him, 33-35. Topics for jesting, and modes of it, 36-46. Ambiguity in words, 47-56. The best jests are taken from things, not from words; of similarity, 57-62. Of dissimilarity, 63-64. From all forms of argument arise occasions for jesting, 65, 66. Jests in the form of tropes and figures, 67-70. Of jocular refutation, 71-78. Of eluding a charge; of pretended confession, 79-81. Some kinds of jests are beneath an orator, 82, 83. Of deceiving expectation, 84-87. Of jocular imitation, 88. Of attributing thoughts to ourselves or others; and of irony, 89-92. The least offensive jokes are the best, 93-95. Quotations from poets, proverbs, and anecdotes, 96-98. Apparent absurdities, 99, 100. Domitius Marsus confounds politeness with humor, 101-107. His distinctions, 108-112. 1. VERY different from this is the talent which, by exciting laughter in the judge, dispels melancholy affections, diverting his mind from too intense application to the subject before it, recruiting at times its powers and reviving it after disgust and fatigue. 2. How difficult it is to succeed in that way even the two greatest of all orators, the one the prince of Greek and the other of Latin eloquence, afford us sufficient proof. Most think that the faculty was altogether wanting to Demosthenes and moderation in the management of it to Cicero. Demosthenes, certainly, cannot be thought to have been unwilling to cultivate it, as his jests, though very few, and by no means correspondent to his other excellences, plainly show that jocularity was not disliked by him, but that it had not been liberally bestowed on him by nature. 3. But as for our own countryman, he was regarded, not only when not engaged in pleading, but even in his public speeches, as too much an affecter of pleasantry. To myself, whether I judge rightly in that respect, or whether I err through immoderate admiration for our great master of eloquence, there appears to have been an extraordinary vein of delicate wit in him. 4. For in his common conversation, in disputes, and in examining witnesses, he uttered more jokes than any other orator. The dull jests in his orations against Verres he attributed to others, repeating them as a part of his evidence, and the more vulgar they are, the more probable is it that they were not of his invention, but had been circulated among the people. 5. I could wish, too, that his freedman Tiro, or whoever it was that published the three books of his jests, had been more sparing as to their number and had used greater judgment in selecting than industry in gathering, for he would then have been less exposed to calumniators, who, however, as in regard to all the productions of his genius, can more easily discover what may be taken away than what may be added. 6. But what causes the chief difficulty in respect to jesting is that a saying adapted to excite laughter is generally based on false reasoning and has always something low in it. It is often purposely sunk into buffoonery; it is never honorable to him who is the subject of it, while the judgments of the hearers with regard to it will be various, as a thing which is estimated, not by any certain reasoning, but by some impulse, I know not whether inexplicable, of the mind. 7. Certainly I think that it has not been sufficiently explained by any one, though many have attempted explanations, whence laughter proceeds, which is excited, not only by actions or words, but sometimes even by a touch of the body. Besides, it is not by one kind of jests only that it is produced, for not merely witty and agreeable acts or sayings, but what is said or done foolishly, angrily, or fearfully are equally the objects of laughter. Thus, the origin of it is doubtful, as laughter is not far from derision. 8. Cicero has said that it has its seat in some deformity or offensiveness, and if this is made to appear in others, the result is called raillery, but if what we say recoils on ourselves, it is but folly. Though laughter may appear, however, a light thing, as it is often excited by buffoons, mimics, and even fools, it has power perhaps more despotic than anything else, such as can by no means be resisted. 9. It bursts forth in people even against their will and extorts a confession of its influence not only from the face and the voice, but shakes the whole frame with its vehemence. It often changes, too, as I said, the tendency of the greatest affairs, as it very frequently dissipates both hatred and anger. 10. Of this the young Tarentines afford an instance, who, having spoken at a banquet with great freedom about king Pyrrhus and being called before him to account for their conduct, when the fact could neither be denied nor justified, saved themselves by a fortunate laugh and jest, for one of them said, "Ah! if our flagon had not failed us, we should have murdered you," and by this pleasantry, the whole odium of the charge was dispelled. 11. But though I should not venture to say that this talent, whatever it is, is certainly independent of art (for it may be cultivated by observation, and rules relating to it have been composed both by Greek and Latin writers), yet I may fairly assert that it chiefly depends on nature and opportunity. 12. Nature, moreover, has influence in it, not only so far that one man is more acute and ready than another in inventing jokes (for such facility may certainly be increased by study), but that there is in certain persons a peculiar grace in their manner and look, so that the same things that they say would, if another were to say them, appear less happy. 13. As to opportunity and circumstances, they have such effect that not only unlearned persons, but even peasants, when favored by them, make witty repartees to such as are first to address them, for all facetiousness appears to greater advantage in reply than in attack. 14. It adds to the difficulty that there is no exercise in this department nor any instructors in it. It is true that at convivial meetings and in the familiar intercourse of life, many jesters are to be met, but their number arises from the circumstance that men improve in jesting by daily practice. The wit that suits the orator is rare and is not cultivated on its own account, but sent for practice to the school of the world. 15. Yet there would be no objection to subjects being invented for this exercise, so that fictitious causes might be pleaded with a mixture of jesting, or particular theses might be proposed to youth exclusively for such practice. 16. Even those very pleasantries which are called jokes, and in which we are accustomed to indulge on certain days of festal license, might, if they were produced with some degree of method or if some serious matter were mingled with them, prove of considerable advantage to the orator; but now they are merely the diversion of youth or of people amusing themselves. 17. In reference to the subject of which we are treating, we commonly use several words to express the same thing, but if we consider them separately, each will be found to have its own peculiar signification. The term "urbanity" is applied to it, by which is meant, I observe, a style of speaking which exhibits in the choice of words, in tone, and in manner, a certain taste of the city and a tincture of erudition derived from conversation with the learned, something, in a word, of which rusticity is the reverse. 18. It is evident that that which is expressed with grace and agreeableness is "graceful." In common conversation, we understand "salty" only as something to make us laugh, but this notion is not founded in nature, though certainly whatever is to make us laugh must be "salty." Cicero says that "everything salty is in the taste of the Attics," but not because the Attics were most of all people inclined to laughter. And when Catullus says of a woman, "There is not a grain of salt in her whole body," he does not mean that there is nothing in her body to excite laughter. 19. That therefore will be "salty" which is not insipid, and "salt" will be a natural seasoning of language, which is perceived by a secret taste, as food is tasted by the palate, and which enlivens discourse and keeps it from becoming wearisome. As salt, too, mixed with food rather liberally, but not so as to be in excess, gives it a certain peculiar relish, so salt in language has a certain charm, which creates in us a thirst, as it were, for hearing more. 20. Nor do I conceive that the facetum is confined solely to that which excites laughter, for if such were the case, Horace would not have said that "the facetum in poetry had been granted by nature to Virgil." I think it rather a term for grace and a certain polished elegance, and it is in this sense that Cicero in his letters quotes these words of Brutus: Nae illi pedes faceti ac deliciis ingredienti molles, "Graceful indeed are her feet, and more gently and with delicacy as she walks," an expression similar to that of Horace, Molle atque facetum Virgilio. 21. Jest we understand as something contrary to that which is serious, for to feign, to intimidate, and to promise are sometimes modes of jesting. Dicacitas is doubtless derived from dico and is common to every species of jesting, but it properly signifies language that attacks a person in order to raise a laugh against him. Thus they say that Demosthenes was urbanus, "witty," but deny that he was dicax, "gifted with the faculty of humorous raillery." 22. But what belongs properly to the subject of which we are treating is that which excites laughter, and thus all discussion on the topic is entitled by the Greeks περὶ γελοίου (peri geloiou). Its primary division is the same as that of every other kind of speech, as it must lie either in things or in words. 23. The application of it is very simple, for we try either to make others the subject of laughter, or ourselves, or something that is foreign to both. What proceeds from others we either blame, or refute, or make light of, or rebut, or elude. As to what concerns ourselves, we speak of it with something of ridicule, and, to adopt a word of Cicero's, utter subabsurda, "apparent absurdities," for the same things, that if they fell from us unawares would be silly, are thought, if we express them with dissimulation, extremely humorous. 24. The third kind, as Cicero also remarks, consists in deceiving expectation, in taking words in a sense different from that in which the speaker uses them, and in allusions to other things, which affect neither ourselves nor others, and which I therefore call intermediate or neutral. 25. In the second place, we either do or say things intended to excite a laugh. Laughter may be raised by some act of humor, with a mixture, sometimes, of gravity, as Marcus Caelius the praetor, when the consul Isauricus broke his curule chair, had another fixed with straps (the consul was said to have been once flogged by his father), or sometimes without due regard to decency, as in the story of Caelius's box, which is becoming neither to an orator nor to any man of proper character. 26. The same may be said of looks and gestures to provoke laughter, from which there may certainly be some amusement, and so much the more when they do not seem to aim at raising a laugh, for nothing is more silly than what is offered as witty. Gravity, however, adds much to the force of jests, and the very circumstance that he who utters a joke does not laugh, makes others laugh; yet sometimes a humorous look, a cast of countenance, or a gesture may be assumed, provided that certain bounds be observed. 27. What is said in jest, moreover, is either gay and cheerful, as most of the jokes of Aulus Galba, or malicious, as those of the late Junius Bassus, or bitter, as those of Cassius Severus, or inoffensive, as those of Domitius Afer. But it makes a great difference where we indulge in jests. At entertainments and in common conversation, a more free kind of speech is allowed to the humbler class of mankind, amusing discourse to all. 28. We should always be unwilling to offend, and the inclination to lose a friend rather than a joke should be far from us. In the very battles of the forum I should wish it to be in my power to use mild words, though it is allowed to speak against our opponents with contumely and bitterness, as it is permitted us to accuse openly, and to seek the life of another according to law. But in the forum, as in other places, to insult another's misfortune is thought inhuman, either because the insulted party may be free from blame or because similar misfortune may fall on him who offers the insult. Therefore, a speaker must first of all consider what his own character is, in what sort of cause he is to speak, before whom, against whom, and what he should say. 29. Distortion of features and gesture, such as is the object of laughter in buffoons, is by no means suited to an orator. Scurrilous jests, too, and such as are used in low comedy, are utterly unbecoming his character. As for indecency, it should be so entirely banished from his language, that there should not be the slightest possible allusion to it, and if it should be imputable, on any occasion, to his adversary, it is not in jest that he should reproach him with it. 30. Though I should wish an orator, moreover, to speak with wit, I should certainly not wish him to seem to affect wit, and therefore he must not speak facetiously as often as he can, but must rather avoid a joke occasionally rather than lower his dignity. 31. No one will endure a prosecutor jesting in a cause of a horrible nature, or a defendant doing so in one of a pitiable nature. There are some judges, also, of too grave a disposition to yield willingly to laughter. It will sometimes occur, too, that reflections which we make on our adversary may apply to the judge or even to our own client. 32. Some orators have been found, indeed, who would not avoid a jest that might recoil even on themselves, as was the case with Sulpicius Longus, who, though he was himself an ugly man, remarked that a person, against whom he appeared on a trial for his right to freedom, had not even the face of a free man. In reply to him, Domitius Afer said, "On your conscience, Longus, do you think that he who has an ugly face cannot be a free man?" 33. We must take care, also, that what we say of this sort may not appear petulant, insulting, unsuitable to the place and time, or premeditated and brought from our study. As to jests on the unfortunate, they are, as I said above, unfeeling. Some persons, too, are of such established authority and such known respectability that insolence in addressing them could not but hurt ourselves. 34. Regarding our friends, a remark has already been made, and it concerns the good sense, not merely of an orator, but of every reasonable being, not to assail in this way one whom it is dangerous to offend, lest bitter enmity or humiliating satisfaction be the consequence. Raillery is also indulged injudiciously that applies to many, if, for example, whole nations, or orders, or conditions, or professions be attacked by it. Whatever a good man says, he will say with dignity and decency, for the price of a laugh is too high if it is raised at the expense of propriety. 35. The ways in which laughter may be fairly excited and from what topics it is generally drawn is very difficult to say, for if we would go through all the species of subjects for it, we should find no end and should labor in vain. 36. For the topics from which jests may be elicited are no less numerous than those from which we call sententiae may be derived, nor are they of a different nature, since in jocularity also there is invention and expression, as well as a display of the force of eloquence consisting partly in a choice of words and partly in the use of figures of speech. 37. But I may say in general that laughter is educed either from corporeal peculiarities in him against whom we speak, or from his state of mind as collected from his actions and words, or from exterior circumstances relating to him. Under these three heads fall all kinds of animadversion, which, if applied severely, is of a serious character, but if lightly, of a ludicrous one. Such subjects for jests are either pointed out to the eye, or related in words, or indicated by some happy remark. 38. But an opportunity rarely offers of bringing them before the eye, as Lucius Julius did when he said to Helvius Mancia, who was repeatedly clamoring against him, "I will now show what you are like." When Mancia persisted and asked Julius to show him what he was like, Julius pointed to the figure of a Gaul painted on a Cimbrian shield, which Mancia was acknowledged exactly to resemble. There were shops round the forum, and the shield was hung over one of them as a sign. 39. To relate a jocular story is eminently ingenious and suitable to an orator, as Cicero in his speech for Cluentius tells a story about Cepasius and Fabricius, and Marcus Caelius that of the contention of Decimus Laelius and his colleague when they were hastening into their province. But in all such recitals, elegance and grace of statement are necessary, and what the orator adds of his own should be the most humorous part of it. 40. So the retirement of Fabricius from the court is thus set off by Cicero: "When Cepasius, therefore, thought that he was speaking with the utmost skill and had drawn forth those solemn words from the innermost stores of his art, 'Look on the old age of Caius Fabricius,' when, I say, he had to embellish his speech, repeated the word 'look' several times, he himself looked, but Fabricius had gone off from his seat with his head hanging down," and what he adds besides (for the passage is well known), when there is nothing in reality told but that Fabricius left the court. 41. Caelius also has invented every circumstance of his narrative most happily, and especially the last: "How he, in following, crossed over, whether in a ship or a fisherman's boat, nobody knew; but the Sicilians, a lively and jocular sort of people, said that he took his seat on a dolphin and sailed across like another Arion." 42. Cicero thinks that humor is shown in recital, and jocularity in smart attacks or defenses. Domitius Afer showed extraordinary wit in narration, and many stories of this kind are to be found in his speeches, but books of his shorter witticisms have also been published. 43. Raillery may also be displayed not in the mere shooting of words, as it were, and short efforts of wit, but in longer portions of a pleading, as that which Cicero relates of Crassus against Brutus in his second book of De Oratore, and in some other passages. 44. When Brutus, in accusing Gnaeus Plancus, had shown, by the mouths of two readers, that Lucius Crassus, the advocate of Plancus, had recommended, in his speech on the colony of Narbonne, measures contrary to those which he had proposed in speaking on the Servilian law, Crassus on his part called up three readers to whom he gave the Dialogues of Brutus' father to read. Because one of those dialogues contained a discourse held on his estate at Privernum, another on that at Alba, and another on that at Tibur, he asked Brutus where all those lands were. But Brutus had sold them all and, for having made away with his father's estates, was considered to have dishonored himself. Similar gratification from narrative attends on the repetition of apologues and sometimes on historical anecdotes. 45. But the brevity observed in jocular sayings has something more of point and liveliness. It may be employed in two ways, in attack or in reply, and the nature of the two is in a great degree the same, for nothing can be said in aggression that may not also be said in retort. 46. Yet there are some points that seem to belong more peculiarly to reply. What is said in attack, those who are heated with anger often utter, but what is said in rejoinder is generally produced in a dispute or in examining witnesses. But as there are innumerable topics from which jokes may be drawn, I must repeat that they are not all suitable for the orator. 47. In the first place, obscure jokes are unbecoming that depend on double meanings and are captious as the jests of an Atellan farce, as well as those that are uttered by the lowest class of people and which out of ambiguity produce obloquy, or even those that sometimes fell from Cicero (though not in his pleadings), as when he said, for instance, on occasion of a candidate for office who was reported to be the son of a cook (coquus), soliciting a vote from another person in his presence, Ego quoque tibi favebo, "I also will support you."48. Not that all words which have two meanings are to be excluded from our speech, but because they rarely have a good effect unless when they are well supported by the matter. Of which sort there is not only a joke of Cicero, almost scurrilous, on Isauricus, the same that I mentioned above, "I wonder what is the reason that your father, the most steady of men, left us a son of so varied a character as yourself," 49. but another excellent jest of his, of the same nature, uttered when the accuser of Milo advanced in proof of an ambush having, been laid for Clodius, that Milo had turned aside to Bovillae before the ninth hour, to wait till Clodius should leave his villa. When Milo's accuser asked several times when Clodius was killed, Cicero replied, "Late!" This repartee is alone sufficient to prevent these sort of jests from being wholly rejected. 50. Nor do ambiguous words only signify more things than one, but even things of the most opposite nature, as Nero said of a dishonest slave, that no one was more trusted in his house, for nothing was shut or sealed up from him. 51. Such ambiguity may be carried so far as to be even enigmatical, as in the jest of Cicero on Pletorius, the accuser of Fonteius, whose mother, he said, had had a school while she was alive, and masters after she was dead. The truth was that women of bad character were said to have frequented her house while she was alive, and that her goods were sold after her death, so that "school" is here used metaphorically, and "masters" ambiguously. 52. This kind of jest often falls into metalēpsis, as Fabius Maximus, remarking on the smallness of the presents which were given by Augustus to his friends, said that his congiaria were heminaria, the word congiarium signifying both a gratuity and a measure, and the word heminarium being employed to show the littleness of the gratuities. 53. This sort of jest is as poor as is the play upon names, by adding, taking away, or altering letters: I have seen, for instance, a man named Acisculus called "Pacisculus," because of some bargain he had made; another named Placidus called "Acidus" for the sourness of his temper; and Tullius, because he was a thief, called "Tollius." 54. But pleasantries of this nature succeed better in allusions to things than to names. Thus Domitius Afer very happily said of Manlius Sura, who, while he was pleading, darted to and fro, leaped up, tossed about his hands, and let fall and re-adjusted his toga: Non agere sed satagere, that "he was not merely doing business in the pleading, but over-doing it." The employment of the word satagere (over-doing) is a very good joke in itself, though there was no play on another word. 55. Such jests—in general equally poor, but sometimes passable—are made by adding or taking away an aspirate, or by joining two words together. Similar also is the nature of all jokes made upon names, many of which are repeated, as the words of others, by Cicero against Verres. In one place he was destined verrere omnia, "to sweep away everything"; in another, "a boar-pig" who had been more troublesome to Hercules, whose temple he had pillaged, than the boar of Erymanthus. In another instance, he was a bad "priest" who had left behind so vicious "a boar," because Verres succeded Sacerdos. 56. Fortune, however, sometimes affords an opportunity of indulging happily in a jest of this kind, as Cicero, in his speech for Caecina, remarked upon a witness named Sextus Clodius Phormio, that "he was not less black, or less bold, than the Phormio of Terence." 57. But jests which are derived from peculiarities in things are more spirited and elegant. Resemblances are most conducive to the production of them, especially if the allusion be to something meaner and of less consideration. This was a sort of pleasantry to which the ancients were attached, as when they called Lentulus "Spinther" (after an inferior actor of that name) and Scipio "Serapion" (because he resembled a dealer in sacrificial animals of that name). 58. But such jests are taken not only from human beings, but from other animals. For example, when I was young, Junius Bassus, a man of extraordinary jocularity, was called a "white ass," and Sarmentus, or Publius Blessus, known as Junius, a black man, lean and crook-backed, was called "an iron clasp." This mode of exciting laughter is now very common. 59. Such comparisons are sometimes made undisguisedly and sometimes insinuated in the way of inference. Of the former sort is the remark of Augustus, who, when a soldier was timidly holding out a memorial to him, said, "Do not shrink back as if you were offering a piece of money to an elephant." 60. Jokes sometimes rest on some fanciful comparison. When Vatinius was on his trial, with Calvus pleading against him, he wiped his forehead with a white handkerchief, and Calvus made this circumstance a subject of reflection on him; Vatinuius responded, "Although I lie under an accusation, I eat white bread." 61. An application of one thing to another, from some similarity between them, is still more ingenious, as when we adapt, as it were, to one purpose that which is intended for another. This may very well be called an "imagination." For instance, when ivory models of his captured towns were carried at one of Caesar's triumphs, and a few days later, wooden models of those Fabius Maximus had taken were exhibited at triumph, Chrysippus observed that Fabius's wooden models were the cases of Caesar's ivory ones. This was similar to what Pedo said of a mirmillo or "swordsman" who was pursuing a retiarius or "netman" but did not strike him: "He wishes to take him alive." 62. Similitude is united with ambiguity, as when Aulus Galba said to a player at ball who was standing to catch the ball very much at his ease, "You stand as if you were one of Caesar's candidates." In the word "stand" there is ambiguity, while the ease is similar in both cases. This it is sufficient to have noticed. 63. But there is very frequently a mixture of different kinds of pleasantry, and the most varied is indeed the best. A like use may be made of things that are dissimilar. A Roman knight who was drinking at the public games was sent, via attendant, the following message from Augustus: "If I wish to dine, I retire to my house." The knight replied, "You, Augustus, are not afraid of losing your place." 64. From contraries there are many kinds of jokes. As Augustus dismissed an officer with dishonor, the officer tried several times to move him with entreaties, saying, "What shall I tell my father?" "Tell him," said the emperor, "that I have displeased you." This is different from when Galba replied to a person who asked to borrow his cloak, "I cannot lend it you, for I am going to stay at home," the fact being that the rain was pouring through the roof into his garret. I will add a third, though respect for its author prevents me from giving his name: "You are more libidinous than any eunuch," where doubtless expectation is deceived by something contrary to that was looked for. Of similar origin, though different from any of the preceding, is the observation of Marcus Vestinius when he was told that some nasty fellow was dead: "He will then at length," said he, "cease to stink." 65. But I should overload my book with examples and make it similar to those composed to excite laughter, if I should go through all the sorts of jests uttered by the ancients. From all modes of argument, there is the same facility for extracting jokes. Thus Augustus employed definition in speaking of two actors in pantomime who vied with each other in gesticulation, calling one a "dancer" and the other "an interrupter of dancing." 66. Galba used distinction when he replied to one who asked him for his cloak, "You cannot have it, for if it does not rain, you will not want it, and if it does rain, I shall wear it myself." Similar matter for jesting is extracted from genus, species, peculiarities, differences, connections, adjuncts, consequents, antecedents, contrarieties, causes, effects, and comparisons of things equal, greater, and less. 67. It is found, too, in all the figures of speech. Are not many jokes made ϰαθ ύπερβολήν by the aid of hyperbole? Cicero gives us one example, in reference to a very tall man, that "he had struck his head against the arch of Fabius." Another is afforded in what Oppius said of the family of the Lentuli, of which the children were invariably shorter than their parents, that "it would by propagation come to nothing." 68. As for irony, is it not in itself, when employed very gravely, a species of joking? Domitus Afer used it very happily when he said to Didiua Gallus, who had made great solicitations for a province and after obtaining it, complained as if he were forced to accept it: "Well, do something for the sake of the commonwealth." Cicero, too, employed it very sportively on a report of the death of Vatinius, for which the authority was said to be far from certain: "In the meantime," he said, "I will enjoy the interest." 69. Cicero used also to say, allegorically, of Marcus Caelius, who was better at accusing than defending, that he had a good right-hand, but a bad left. Julius used antonomasia when he said Ferrum Accium Noevium incidisse. 70. Jocularity also admits all figures of thought, called by the Greeks σχήματα διανοίας (schēmata dianoias), under which some have ranked the various species of jests, for we ask questions, and express doubt, and affirm, and threaten, and wish; and we make some remarks as if in compassion, and others with anger. But everything is jocular that is evidently pretended. 71. To laugh at foolish remarks is very easy, for they are ridiculous in themselves, but some addition of our own increases the wit. When Titus Maximus foolishly asked Carpathius as he leaving the theater whether he had seen the play, Carpathius made the question appear more ridiculous by replying, "No, for I was playing ball in the orchestra." 72. Refutation admits of jesting either in the form of denial, retort, defense, or extenuation. Manius Curius made a good repartee by way of denial: when his accuser had had him painted on a curtain, shown as either stripped and in prison, or being redeemed by his friends from a gambling debt, he replied "Was I, then, never successful?" 73. Retort we use sometimes undisguisedly, as Cicero said in reply to Vibius Curius, who was telling falsehood concerning his age, "Then, when we declaimed in the schools together, you were not born," or sometimes with feigned assent, as the same orator said to Fabia, Dolabella's wife, who observed that she was thirty years old, "No doubt, for I have heard you say so these twenty years." 74. Sometimes in place of what you deny, something more cutting is happily substituted. When Domitia, the wife of Passienus, complained that Junius Bassus had charged in meanness against her that she used to sell old shoes, Bassus replied "No, indeed, I never said any such thing; I said that you used to buy them." When Augustus reproached a Roman knight for having eaten up his patrimony, the knight replied in defense, "I thought it was my own." 75. Of extenuation there are two modes. In the first, a person may make light of another's claims to indulgence or of some boast that he utters. Thus Caius Caesar said to Pomponius, who was showing a wound which he had received in his mouth during the sedition of Sulpicius, but which he boasted he had received in fighting for Caesar, "When you are fleeing, never look back." In the second mode, it may extenuate some fault imputed to us, as Cicero said to those who reproached him at age sixty for marrying the virgin Publilia, "Tomorrow she will be a woman." 76. Some call this kind of jest a consequent and similar to that of Cicero when he said that Curio, who always began his pleadings with an excuse for his age, "would find his exordium easier every day," because the reply seems naturally to follow and attach itself to the remark. 77. But one kind of extenuation is a suggestion of a reason, such as Cicero gave to Vatinius, who, having the gout but wishing to appear improved in health, said that he could walk two miles a day. "The days," rejoined Cicero, "are very long." Augustus made a similar answer to the people of Tarraco, who told him that a palm tree had grown on his altar in their city: "It shows," he said, "how often you make a fire on it." 78. Cassius Severus transferred a charge from himself to others; when he was reproached by the praetor because his advocates had insulted Lucius Varus , an Epicurean friend of Caesar, he replied, "I do not know what sort of characters committed the insult, but I suppose they must have been Stoics." There are many ways of rebutting a jest, but the happiest is that which is aided by some resemblance in the words, as when Suellius said to Trachalus, "If this is so, you go into exile," and Trachalus replied, "And if it is not so, you return into exile." 79. When someone made a charge against Cassius Severus that Proculeius had forbidden him in his house, he eluded the charge by replying, "Do I ever then go to Proculeius's house?" One jest is thus eluded by another: when the Emperor Augustus was given a hundred-pound collar as a gift by the Gauls, Dolabella had said in jest, though with some solicitude as to the event of the jest, "Distinguish me, General, with the honor of the collar," to which Augustus replied, "I would rather distinguish you with the honor of a civic crown." 80. Likewise, one falsehood may also be eluded by another, as when someone said at Galba's hearing that he had paid one victoriatus for a five-foot-long lamprey in Sicily, Galba rejoined that it was not at all surprising, as they grew so long there that the fishermen used them for ropes. 81. Opposed to the negative is the pretense of confession, which also has much wit. When Domitius Afer was pleading against a freedman of Claudius Caesar, and another of the same status called out from the opposite side of the court, "Do you then always speak against the freedmen of Caesar?" Afer replied, "Always, and yet, by Hercules, I produce no effect." Similar to confession is not to deny what is alleged, though it be evidently false and opportunity for an excellent answer be suggested by it, as Catulus, when Philippus asked him, "Why do you bark?" replied, "Because I see a thief." 82. To joke upon oneself is the part only of a buffoon and is by no means allowable in an orator. It may be done in as many ways as we joke upon others; therefore, though it be too common, I pass it over. 83. Moreover, that which is expressed scurrilously or passionately, though it may raise a laugh, is unworthy of a respectable man. I know a man who said to an inferior person who had addressed him with too little respect, "I will inflict a blow on your head and bring an action against you for hurting my hand by the hardness of your head." At such a saying, it is doubtful whether the hearers ought to laugh or feel indignation. 84. There remains to be noticed the kind of joke that consists in deceiving expectation, or taking the words of another in a sense different from that in which he uses them. Of all sorts of jests, these may be said to be the happiest. But an unexpected turn may be adopted even by one who attacks, such as that of which Cicero gives an example: "What is wanting to this man except fortune and virtue?" Or as that of Domitius Afer: "For a man pleading causes, he is excellently dressed." Or it may be used in anticipating the answer of another person. Thus Cicero, on hearing a false report of the death of Vatinius, asked his freedman Ovinius, "Is all well?" When Ovinius said that it was, Cicero rejoined, "He is then dead?" 85. Great laughter attends on simulation and dissimulation, which may be thought similar and almost the same. But simulation is the act of one who pretends to feel a certain persuasion in his mind, while dissimulation is that of one who feigns not to understand another's meaning. Domitius Afer used simulation when during a trial someone reiterated that Celsina, a woman of some influence, knew the facts, and he asked, "Who is he?" wishing to make it appear that he thought Celsina a man. 86. Cicero used dissimulation when a witness named Sextus Annalis had given testimony against a person whom he was defending, and the prosecutor several times pressed him, crying, "Tell us, Marcus Cicero, whether you can say anything of Sextus Annalis." Cicero immediately began to recite from the sixth book of the Annals of Ennius, Quis potis ingentis causas evolvere belli? 87. For this kind of jest, ambiguity doubtless affords the most frequent opportunity, as it did to Cascellius, who, when a person consulting him said, "I wish to divide my ship," rejoined, "You will lose it then." But the thoughts are often sent in another direction by a remark being turned away from something of greater to something of less consequence, as when the person who was asked what he thought of a man caught in adultery, replied "He was slow." 88. Of a similar nature is that which is said in such a manner as to convey a suspicion of the meaning, as in this example from Cicero: when a man was lamenting that his wife had hung herself on a fig tree, another said to him, "I beg you to give me a slip of that tree that I may plant it. "The meaning, though not expressed, is very well understood. 89. Indeed all facetiousness lies in expressing things with some deviation from the natural and genuine sense of the words employed, and this is wholly done by misrepresenting our own or other people's thoughts, or by stating something that cannot be. 90. Juba misrepresented the thought of another when he said to a man that complained of having been bespattered by his horse, "What! do you think me a Hippocentaur?" Caius Cassius misrepresented his own when he said to a soldier hurrying to the field without his sword, "Ah! comrade, you will use your fist well." And Galba did the same when some fish, which had been partly eaten the day before, were put upon the table with their other side uppermost: "Let us make haste to eat," he said, "for there are people under the table supping upon the same dish." Of the same sort is the jest of Cicero on Curius, which I have just mentioned, for it was impossible that he should not have been born when he was declaiming. 91. There is a certain misrepresentation, too, that has its origin in irony of which Caius Caesar gives us an example: a witness said that his groin had been wounded by the accused person, and it was easy to show why he had wished to wound that part of his body rather than any other; Caesar preferred to say, "What else could he do, when you had a helmet and a coat of mail?" 92. But the best of all simulation is that which is directed against one who simulates, such as this example: Domitius After had made a will some time ago, and a man whom he had taken into his friendship since the date of it, hoping to gain something should he alter it, told Afer a story of his own invention, asking whether he should advise an old chief centurion who had already made his will to make another. "By no means do so," Afer said, "for you will offend him." 93. But the most agreeable of all such pleasantries are those good-natured and, so to speak, easy of digestion. Afer again offers examples: He once had an ungrateful client who avoided recognition from him one day in the forum, so he sent this message to him by an attendant: "Are you not obliged to me for not having seen you?" Or again, when Afer addressed his steward, who was unable to give an account of the money in his hands and remarked several times, "I have eaten no bread, and I drink water": "Sparrow," Afer said, "return what you ought to return." These kinds of jokes they call jokes applicable to character. 94. It is a pleasing sort of jest, too, that lays less to the charge of another than might be laid. When a candidate for office asked Afer for his vote, saying, "I have always respected your family," Afer, when he might have boldly denied the assertion, said, "I believe you as if it were true." It is sometimes amusing to speak of one's self. Also, that which would be ill-natured if said about a person in his absence is mere subject for laughter when uttered as an attack upon him to his face. 95. Such was the remark of Augustus when a soldier requested something unreasonable of him, and Marcianus, whom Augustus suspected of intending to ask of him something unjust, came up at the time: "I will no more do what you ask, comrade," Augustus said to the soldier, "than I will do what Marcianus is going to ask." 96. Verses, aptly quoted, also have given great effect to witticisms, whether introduced entire and just as they are (a thing so easy, that Ovid has composed a book against bad poets in verses taken from the Tetrastichs of Macer). This mode of citation is more agreeable if it be seasoned with something of ambiguity, as in Cicero's remark about Marcius, a man of much cunning and artifice, when he was suspected of unfair dealing in a cause: Nisi quâ Ulixes rate evasit Laertius, 97. Or with some little change in the words, as when Cicero jested on a senator, who, having been always thought extremely foolish, was after inheriting an estate called upon first to give his vote in the senate, saying, Cujus hereditas est quam vocant sapientiam, putting hereditas, "estate" for facilitas, "faculty." Or by inventing verses similar to some well-known verses, which is called a parody. 98. Or proverbs may be aptly applied, as a person said to a man of bad character who had fallen down and asked to be helped up, "Let some one take you up who does not know you." To take a jest from history shows learning, as Cicero did during the trial of Verres. When he was examining a witness, Hortensius observed, "I do not understand these enigmas," to which Cicero replied, "But you ought, as you have a Sphinx at home," for Hortensius had received from Verres a bronze Sphinx of great value. 99. As to apparent absurdities, they consist in an imitation of foolish sayings and would, if they were not affected, be foolish, such as that of the man who, when the people expressed their wonder that he had bought a low candlestick, said to them, "It will serve me for breakfast." But some that are very like absurdities and that seem to be said without any reason at all are extremely pointed, as when Dolabella's slave was asked whether his master had advertised a sale of his property, to which he replied, "He has sold his house." 100. Persons taken by surprise sometimes get rid of their embarrassment by a jest. During trial, an advocate asked a witness, who said that he had been wounded by the accused, whether he had a scar to show. When the witness showed a large one on his groin, the advocate observed, "He ought to have aimed at your side." It is also possible to use insulting expressions happily, as Hispo, when his accuser twice imputed heinous crimes to him, replied, "You lie." And when Legatus asked Fulvius whether a will which he produced had a signature, Fulvius replied, "And a true one, master." 101. These are the most usual sources that I have either found, indicated by others or discovered for myself, from which jests may be derived. But I must repeat that there are as many subjects for facetiousness as for gravity, which are all suggested to us by an almost infinite number of persons, places, occasions, and chances. 102. I have therefore touched upon these points that I might not seem to neglect them. Though unsatisfactory, what I have said on the practice and manner of jesting was nevertheless necessary. To these Domitius Marsus, who wrote a very carefully studied treatise on urbanitas ("urbanity") adds some examples of sayings that are not laughable, but admissible even into the gravest speeches. They are elegantly expressed and rendered agreeable by a certain peculiar kind of wit. They are indeed urbana ("urbane" or "polished,") but have nothing to do with the ridiculous. 103. Nor was his work intended to treat laughter, but instead urbanitas, which, he says, is peculiar to our city and was not at all understood till a late period, after which it became common for the term urbs (though the proper name was not added) to be taken as signifying Rome. 104. He thus defines it:
But this definition, if we take from it the particular of conciseness, may be considered as embracing all the excellences of language, for if it concerns things and persons, to say what property applies to each of them is the part of consummate eloquence. Why he made conciseness a necessary condition, I do not know. 105. But in the same book, a little farther on, he defines another kind of urbanitas, peculiar to narrative (which has been displayed, he says, in many speakers) in the following manner, adhering, as he states, to the opinion of Cato:
106. But if we accept these definitions, whatever is said well will also have the character of urbanitas. For a writer who proposed such specifications, it was natural to make such a division of urbane sayings as to call some serious, some jocose, and others intermediate, for this division applies to all properly expressed thoughts. 107. But to me, even some sayings that are jocose appear not to be expressed with sufficient urbanitas, which in my judgment is a character of oratory in which there is nothing incongruous, nothing coarse, nothing unpolished, nothing barbarous to be discovered, either in the thoughts, or the words, or the pronunciation, or the gestures. It is not to be sought in singular words, but in the whole complexion of speech, like Atticism among the Greeks, which was a delicacy of taste peculiar to the city of Athens. 108. Yet that I may not do injustice to the judgment of Marsus, who was a very learned man, I will add that he divides urbanitas, as applied to serious sayings, into the three types—the commendatory, the reproachful, and the intermediate. Of the commendatory, he gives an example from Cicero, in his speech for Ligarius, when he says to Caesar, "Thou who art wont to forget nothing but injuries." 109. Of the reproachful, he gives as an instance what Cicero wrote to Atticus concerning Pompey and Caesar: "I have one whom I can avoid; one whom I can follow, I have not." Of the intermediate, which he calls apopthegmatic, he cites as a specimen these other words of Cicero: "that death could never be either grievous to a brave man, or premature to a man who has attained the consulship, or calamitous to a wise man." All these passages are very happily expressed, but I do not see why they should be peculiarly distinguished by the character of urbanitas. 110. If it is not the whole complexion of a composition (as it appears to me) that entitles it to this distinction, and if the term is to be applied to single expressions, I should rather give the character of urbanitas to those sayings which are of the kind called droll, but which yet are not droll, such as the following. 111. It was said of Asinius Pollio, who could adapt himself either to business or to pleasure, that he was a man for all hours, and of a pleader who spoke with ease extemporaneously, that he had all his wit in ready cash. Such, too, was the saying of Pompey, which Marsus notices, addressed to Cicero, who expressed distrust of his party: "go over to Caesar, then, and you will fear me." However, if this had been uttered on a less important occasion, or in another spirit, or by any other person than Pompey, it might have been numbered among droll sayings. 112. To these may be added what Cicero wrote to Cerellia, assigning a reason why he so patiently endured the proceedings of Caesar: "These things must be borne, either with the mind of a Cato or with the stomach of a Cicero," for the word stomach carries with it something like a jest. These reflections, which struck me with regard to the definitions of Marsus, I could not withhold from my readers. Though I may have erred in these reflections, I have not deceived my readers, having pointed out at the same time a different opinion, which it is free for those who approve it to follow.
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