Peroration of a speech; the objects of it; some think that it should consist wholly of recapitulation, § 1-8. Appeals to the feelings may be made by the accuser and the advocate alike, 9. What the exordium and the peroration have in common, and in what respects they differ, 10-14. The accuser excites the feelings either by showing the heinousness of the charge which he makes, or the pitiable condition of the party for whom he seeks redress, 15-20. What qualities excite feeling in favor of an accused person, 21, 22. Solicitation for pity may have great effect, but should not be long, 23-28. Modes of exciting pity, 29-36. How persons who are introduced to move pity at the conclusion of a speech, should behave themselves, 37-43. No orator must attempt to draw tears from the judges unless he be a man of great ability, 44, 45. It is the part of the peroration to dispel compassionate emotions, as well as to excite them, 46-49. Perorations sometimes of a very mild character, 50. Appeals to the feelings may be made in other parts of a speech as well as in the peroration, 51-65. 1. WHAT was to follow was the peroration, which some have termed the completion, and others the conclusion. There are two species of it, the one comprising the substance of the speech, and the other adapted to excite the feelings. The repetition and summing-up of heads, which is called by the Greeks ᾽ανακεϕαλαίωσις (anakephalaiōsis), "going over the headings," and by some of the Latins "enumeration," is intended both to refresh the memory of the judge, to set the whole cause at once before his view, and to enforce such arguments in a body as had produced an insufficient effect in detail. 2. In this part of our speech, what we repeat ought to be repeated as briefly as possible, and we must, as is intimated by the Greek term, run over only the principal heads, for if we dwell upon them, the result will be not a recapitulation, but a sort of second speech. What we may think necessary to recapitulate must be put forward with some emphasis, enlivened by suitable remarks and varied with different figures, for nothing is more offensive than mere straightforward repetition, as if the speaker distrusted the judge's memory. The figures which we may employ are innumerable, and Cicero affords us an excellent example in his pleading against Verres: 3. "If your father himself were your judge, what would he say when these things were proved against you?" where he subjoins an enumeration of particulars, and there is another instance, in which the same orator, in the same speech, enumerates, on invoking the gods, all the temples spoiled by Verres in his praetorship. We may also sometimes affect to doubt whether something has not escaped us and to wonder what our opponents will reply to such or such a point, or what hope the accuser can have when our case is so fully established. 4. But what affords us the greatest gratification is the opportunity of drawing some argument from the speech of our adversary, as when we say, "He has omitted this point in the cause," or, "He made it his object to oppress us with odium," or, "He had recourse to entreaty, and not without reason, when he knew so and so." 5. But I must not go through such figures of speech, severally, lest those which I may now notice should be thought the only ones that can be used, since opportunities for varying our forms of speech spring from the nature of particular causes, from the remarks of the adversary, and even from fortuitous circumstances. Nor must we recapitulate only the points of our own case, but call also upon our opponent to reply to certain questions. But this can only be done when there is time for further speaking, and when we have advanced what cannot be refuted, for to challenge the adversary on facts which make strongly for him is to be not his opponent, but his prompter. 7. Most of the Attic orators, and almost all the philosophers who have left anything written on the art of oratory, thought this the only legitimate kind of peroration, a tenet which the Attic orators adopted, I suppose, for this reason: at Athens, an orator was prohibited even by an officer of the court from attempting to excite the feelings. At the philosophers I am less surprised, since with them all excitement of the feelings is accounted vicious, nor is it consistent with morality, in their opinion, that a judge should be thus diverted from truth, nor appropriate for a good man to use vicious means. Yet they will allow that to move the feelings is justifiable, if what is true, and just, and subservient to the public good, cannot be established by any other method. 8. It is admitted, however, among all orators that a recapitulation may he made with advantage even in other parts of a pleading, if the cause be complex and requires support by numerous arguments. Nobody doubts, on the other hand, that there are many short and simple causes in which recapitulation is by no means necessary. This part of the peroration is common alike both to the prosecutor and the defendant. 9. Both of them also have recourse to the excitement of the feelings, but the defendant more rarely, the prosecutor more frequently and with greater earnestness, for the prosecutor has to rouse the judge, while the defendant's business is to soothe him. But the prosecutor at times produces tears from the pity which he expresses for the matter for which he seeks redress, and the defendant sometimes inveighs with great vehemence at the injustice of the calumny or conspiracy of which he is the object. It is therefore most convenient to divide these duties, which are for the most part similarly introduced, as I said, in the exordium, but are in the peroration more free and full. 10. A feeling of the judge in our favor is sought but modestly at the commencement, when it is sufficient that it be just admitted, and when the whole speech is before us. But in the peroration, we have to mark with what sort of feeling the judge will proceed to consider his sentence, as we have then nothing more to say, and no place is left us for which we can reserve further arguments. 11. It is therefore common to each party to endeavor to attract the favor of the judge towards himself, to withdraw it from his adversary, and to excite the feelings and to compose them. This very brief admonition may be given to both parties, that a pleader should bring the whole force of his cause before his view and, when he has noticed among its various points what is likely, or may be made likely, to excite disapprobation or favor, dislike or pity, should dwell on those particulars by which he himself, if he were judge, would be most impressed. 12. But it is safer for me to consider the parts of each separately. What recommends the prosecutor to the judge, I have already noticed in the precepts which I have given for the exordium. Some particulars, however, which it is sufficient to intimate in the commencement, must be stated more fully in the conclusion, especially if the cause be undertaken against a violent, odious, or dangerous character, or if the condemnation of the accused will be an honor to the judges, and his acquittal a disgrace to them. 13. Thus Calvus makes an admirable remark in his speech against Vatinius: "You know, judges, that bribery has been committed, and all men know that you know it." Cicero, too, in pleading against Verres, observes that "the disrepute which had fallen on the courts might be effaced by the condemnation of Verres," and this is one of the conciliatory modes of address to which I have before alluded. If intimidation, too, is to be used, in order to produce a similar effect, it has a more forcible position here than in the exordium. What my opinion is on this point, I have already stated in another book. 14. It is possible also to excite jealousy, hatred, or indignation more freely in the peroration than elsewhere; in regard to these feelings, the influence of the accused contributes to excite jealousy in the judge. Likewise, the accused's ill-reputation can cause hatred in the judge, and disrespect for the judge (if the accused be contumacious, arrogant, or full of assurance) can cause indignation, as the judge is often influenced, not only by an act or word, but by a look, air, or manner. The accuser of Cossutianus Capito was thought, when I was young, to have made a very happy remark, in Greek, indeed, but to this effect, "You are ashamed to fear even Caesar." 15. But the most effective way for the accuser to excite the feelings of the judge is to make that which he lays to the charge of the accused appear the most atrocious act possible, or, if the subject allow, the most deplorable. Atrocity is made to appear from such considerations as these, "What has been done, by whom, against whom, with what feeling, at what time, in what place, in what manner," all which have infinite ramifications. 16. We complain that somebody has been beaten; we must first speak of the act, and then state whether the sufferer was an old man, or a youth, or a magistrate, or a man of high character, or one who has deserved well of his country. We also state whether he was struck by some vile contemptible fellow, or, on the other hand, by some tyrannical person, or by some one from whom he ought least of all to have received such treatment; also whether he was struck as it might be, on a solemn festival, or when prosecutions for similar offenses were being rigorously conducted, or at a time when the government was unsettled, or, as to place, in a theater, in a temple, in a public assembly, for under such circumstances the offense is aggravated. 17. We might also consider whether it can be proved that he was not struck by mistake, or in a sudden fit of passion, or, if in a passion, with great injustice, when, perhaps, he was taking the part of his father, or had made some reply to the aggressor, or was standing for office in opposition to him, and whether the aggressor would have proceeded to greater violence than he actually committed. But the manner contributes most to the heinousness of the act, if he struck the person violently or insultingly, as Demosthenes excites odium against Meidias by alluding to the part of his body which was struck, and the look and mien of the striker. 18. A man has been killed; we must consider whether it was with a sword, or fire, or poison; with one wound or with several; whether suddenly; or whether he was made to languish in tortures, all which have great effect in this way. The accuser, also, often attempts to excite pity, as when he bewails the sad fate of him whose cause he is pleading or the destitution of his children or parents. 19. He may also move the judges by a representation of the future, showing what will be the consequences to those who complain of violence and injustice, unless their cause be avenged, that they must flee from their country, sacrifice their property, or endure everything that their enemies may be disposed to inflict on them. 20. But it is more frequently the part of the accuser to guard the feelings of the judge against that pity which the accused would seek to excite and to urge him to give judgment with boldness. In doing so, he may also anticipate what he thinks his opponent is likely to say or do, for this course makes the judges more cautious in adhering to the sacredness of their oath and diminishes the influence of those who have to reply, since what has been once stated by the accuser will, if urged in favor of the accused, be no longer new. Thus, Messala, in pleading for Aufidia, admonishes Servius Sulpioius about arguments regarding the danger to both the defendant herself and those who had signed the instrument. It is also previously intimated by Aeschines what sort of defense Demosthenes was likely to use. Judges may sometimes be instructed, too, as to answers which they should make to those who may solicit them in favor of the defendant, an instruction which is a species of recapitulation. 21. As to a party on trial, his dignity, or manly pursuits, or wounds received in war, or nobility of birth, or the services of his ancestors, may be subjects of recommendation to him. This kind of consideration Cicero and Asinius Pollio have urged even emulously, Cicero for Scaurus the father, and Pollio for Scaurus the son. 22. The cause, also, which has brought him into danger, may be pleaded in his favor, if he appear, for example, to have incurred enmity for some honorable act, and his goodness, humanity, pity, may especially be eulogized, for a person seems justly to solicit from the judge that which he himself has shown to others. In this part of a speech, too, allusions may be made to the public good, to the honor of the judges, to precedent, and to regard for posterity. 23. But that which produces the most powerful impression is pity, which not only forces the judge to change his opinions, but to manifest the feelings in his breast even by tears. Pity will be excited by dwelling either on that which the accused has suffered, or on that which he is actually suffering, or on that which awaits him if he be condemned. Such representations have double force when we show from what condition he has fallen and into what condition he is in danger of falling. 24. To these considerations, age and sex may add weight as well as objects of affection, by which I mean children, parents, and other relatives, and all these matters may be treated in various ways. Sometimes, also, the advocate numbers himself among his client's connections, as Cicero in his speech for Milo: "O unhappy that I am! O unfortunate that thou art! Could you, Milo, by means of those who are this day your judges, recall me into my country, and cannot I, by means of the same judges, retain you in yours?" 25. This is a very good resource, if, as was then the case, entreaty is unsuited to the party who is accused, for who would endure to hear Milo supplicating for his life, when he acknowledged that he had killed a nobleman because he deserved to be killed? Cicero, therefore, sought to gain Milo the favor of the judges for his magnanimity and took upon himself the part of suppliant for him. In this part of a speech, prosopopoeiae are extremely effective, that is, fictitious addresses delivered in another person's character, such as are suitable either to a prosecutor or defendant. Even mute objects may touch the feelings, either when we speak to them ourselves or represent them as speaking. 26. But the feelings are very strongly moved by the personification of characters, for the judge seems not to be listening to an orator lamenting the sufferings of others, but to hear with his own ears the expressions and tones of the unfortunate suppliants themselves, whose presence, even without speech, would be sufficient to call forth tears. As their pleadings would excite greater pity if they themselves uttered them, so they are in some degree more effective when they are spoken apparently by their own mouth in a personification; as with actors on the stage, the same voice and the same pronunciation have greater power to excite the feelings when accompanied with a mask representing the character. 27. Cicero, accordingly, though he puts no entreaties into the mouth of Milo, but rather commends him to favor for his firmness of mind, has yet attributed to him words and lamentations not unworthy of a man of spirit: "O labors, undertaken by me in vain! O deceitful hopes! O thoughts, cherished by me to no purpose!" Yet our supplications for pity should not be long, as it is observed, not without reason, that nothing dries sooner than tears. 28. Since time lessens even natural sorrows, the representation of sorrow which we produce in a speech, must lose its effect still sooner, and if we linger in it, the hearer, wearied with tears, will recover his tranquillity and return from the emotion which had surprised him to the exercise of his reason. 29. Let us not allow the impressions that we make, therefore, to cool, but when we have raised the feelings of our audience to the utmost, let us quit the subject and not expect that any person will long bewail the misfortunes of another. Not only in other parts of our speech, accordingly, but most of all in this part, our eloquence ought gradually to rise, for whatever does not add to that which has been said seems even to take away from it, and the feeling which begins to subside soon passes away. 30. We may excite tears, however, not only by words, but by acts, and hence it becomes a practice to exhibit persons on their trial in a squalid and pitiful garb, accompanied with their children and parents. Hence, too, we see blood-stained swords produced by accusers, with fractured bones extracted from wounds and garments spotted with blood; we behold wounds unbound and scourged backs exposed to view. 31. The effect of such exhibitions is generally very strong, so that they fix the attention of the spectators on the act as if it were committed before their eyes. The blood-stained toga of Julius Caesar, when exhibited in the forum, excited the populace of Rome almost to madness. It was known that he was killed, his body was even stretched on the bier, yet his robe, drenched in blood, excited such a vivid idea of the crime that Caesar seemed not to have been assassinated, but to be subjected to assassination at that very moment. 32. But I would not, for that reason, approve of a device of which I have read and which I have myself seen adopted, a representation, displayed in a painting or on a curtain, of the act at the atrocity of which the judge was to be shocked. For how conscious must a pleader be of his inefficiency who thinks that a dumb picture will speak better for him than his own words? 33. But a humble garb and wretched appearance, on the part of the accused as well as of his relatives, has, I know, been of much effect, and I am aware that entreaties have contributed greatly to save accused persons from death. To implore mercy of the judges, therefore, by the defendant's dearest objects of affection (that is to say, if he has children, wife, or parents) will be of great advantage, as well as to invoke the gods, since such invocation seems to proceed from a clear conscience. 34. To fall prostrate, also, and embrace the knees of the judge may be allowable at times, unless the character of the accused, and his past life and station, dissuade him from such humiliation, for there are some deeds that ought to be defended with the same boldness with which they were committed. But regard is to be had to the defendant's dignity, with such caution that an offensive confidence may not appear in him. 35. Among all arguments for a client, the most potent, in former times, was that by means of which Cicero seems chiefly to have saved Lucius Muraena from the eminent men who were his accusers, when he persuaded them that nothing was more advantageous for the state of things at that period than that Muraena should enter on his consulship the day before the Kalends of January. But this kind of argument is wholly set aside in our days, as everything depends on the care and protection of our sovereign and cannot be endangered by the issue of any single cause. 36. I have spoken of prosecutors and defendants, because it is on their trials that the pathetic is chiefly employed. But private causes also admit both kinds of perorations, that which consists in a recapitulation of proofs and that which depends on the excitement of the feelings, the latter having place whenever the accused party is in danger either as to station or as to character. For to attempt such tragic pleadings in trifling causes would be like trying to adjust the mask and buskins of Hercules on an infant. 37. Nor is it improper for me to intimate that much of the success of a peroration depends, in my opinion, on the manner in which the defendant, who is presented before the judge, accommodates his demeanor to that of him who pleads in his favor, for ignorance, rusticity, stiffness, and vulgarity in a client sometimes damp a pleader's efforts, and against such untowardness he should take diligent precaution. 38. I have seen the behavior of clients quite at variance with the language of their advocate, showing no concern in their countenance, laughing without reason, and, by some act or look, making even others laugh, especially when anything was delivered at all theatrically. 39. On one occasion, an advocate led a girl, who was said to be the sister of the adverse party (for it was about that point that the controversy was) over to the opposite benches, as if intending to leave her in the arms of her brother. But the brother, previously instructed by me, had gone off, and the advocate, although an eloquent man at other times, was struck dumb by his unexpected disappearance and, with his ardor cooled, took his little girl back again. 40. Another advocate, pleading for a woman who was on her trial, thought it would have a great effect to exhibit the likeness of her deceased husband, but the image excited little else but laughter, for the persons whose business it was to produce it, being ignorant what a peroration meant, displayed it to view whenever the advocate looked towards them and, when it was brought still more into sight at the conclusion, it destroyed the effect of all his previous eloquence by its ugliness, being a mere cast from an old man's dead body. 41. It is well known, too, what happened to Glycon, surnamed Spiridion: A little boy, whom he brought into court, and asked "Why he was weeping," replied, "That he had had his ears pulled by his tutor." But nothing is better adapted to show the dangers attendant on perorations than the story of Cicero about the Cepasii. 42. Yet all such mishaps are easily remedied by those who can alter the fashion of their speech; but those who cannot vary from what they have composed are either struck dumb at such occurrences or, as is frequently the case, say what is not true, for hence are such impertinences as these: "He is raising his supplicating hands towards your knees," or, "He is locked, unhappy man, in the embraces of his children," or, "See, he recalls my attention, etc.," though the client does no single thing of all that his advocate attributes to him. 43. These absurdities come from the schools, in which we give play to our imagination freely and with impunity, because whatever we wish is supposed to be done. But reality does not allow of such suppositions, and Cassius Severus made a most happy retort to a young orator who said, "Why look you so sternly on me, Severus?" "I did not, I assure you," replied Cassius, "but you had written those words, I suppose, in your notes, and so here is a look for you," when he threw on him as terrible a glance as he could possibly assume. 44. The student ought, above all things, to be admonished, also, that an orator should not attempt to excite tears unless he be endowed with extraordinary genius, for as the effect on the feelings, if he succeeds, is extremely powerful, so, if he is unsuccessful, the result is vapidity. A middling pleader had better leave the pathos to the quiet meditations of the judges, 45. for the look, tone, and even the very face of a defendant called to stand before the judges are a laughing-stock to such persons as they do not move. Let a pleader, therefore, in such a case, carefully measure and contemplate his strength and consider how difficult a task he will have to undertake. In the result there will be no medium, he will either provoke tears or laughter. 46. But the business of a peroration is not only to excite feelings of pity, but also to deaden them, either by a set speech, which may recall the judges, when shaken by compassion, to considerations of justice, or by some jocose remark, as, "Give the child a cake, that he may leave off crying," or as a pleader said to his corpulent client, whose opponent, a mere child, had been carried round among the judges by his advocate, "What shall I do? I cannot carry you." 47. But such pleasantries must have nothing of buffoonery, and I cannot praise the orator, though he was among the most eminent of his time, who, when some children were brought in at the peroration by the opposite party, threw some playthings among them, towards which they began to scramble, for the children's insensibility to any ill that threatened them might of itself excite compassion. 48. Nor can I commend him, who, when a blood stained sword was produced by his adversary, which he offered as a proof that a man had been killed, suddenly took flight, as if terrified, from his seat, and looking out from the crowd, with his head half covered with his robe, asked whether the man with the sword was yet gone, for he raised a laugh, indeed, but made himself at the same time ridiculous. 49. The effect of such acting is to be dispelled by the calm power of eloquence, and Cicero gives us excellent examples, such as in his oration for Rabirius, when he attacks with great force the production of the likeness of Saturninus, and, in his speech for Varenus, when he rallies with much wit the young man whose wound was unbound from time to time during the trial. 50. There are also perorations of a milder sort, in which we seek to pacify an adversary, if his character, for instance, be such that respect is due to him, or in which we give him some friendly admonition and exhort him to concord. This kind of peroration was admirably managed by Passienus when he pleaded the cause of his wife Domitia, to recover a sum of money, against her brother Aenobarbus, for after he had enlarged on their relationship, he added some remarks on their fortune, of which both had abundance, saying, "There is nothing of which you have less need than that about which you are contending." 51. But all these addresses to the feelings, though they are thought by some to have a place only in the exordium and the peroration, in which indeed they are most frequently introduced, are admissible also in other parts, but more sparingly, as it is from them that the decision of the cause must be chiefly evolved. But in the peroration, if anywhere, we may call forth all the resources of eloquence, 52. for if we have treated the other parts successfully, we are secure of the attention of the judges at the conclusion, where, having passed the rocks and shallows on our voyage, we may expand our sails in safety, and as amplification forms the greatest part of a peroration, we may use language and thoughts of the greatest magnificence and elegance. It is then that we may shake the theater, when we come to that with which the old tragedies and comedies were concluded, Plaudite, "Give us your applause." 53. But in other parts we must work upon the feelings, as occasion for working on any of them may present itself, for matters of a horrible or lamentable nature should never be related without exciting in the mind of the judges a feeling in conformity with them, and when we discuss the quality of any act, a remark addressed to the feelings may be aptly subjoined to the proof of each particular point. 54. And when we plead a complicated cause, consisting, it may be said, of several causes, we shall be under the necessity of using, as it were, several perorations, as Cicero has done in his pleading against Verres, for he has lamented over Philodamus, over the captains of the vessels, over the tortures of the Roman citizens, and over several other of that praetor's victims. 55. Some call these μερικοὶ ἐπίλογοι (merikoi epilogoi), by which they mean "parts of a divided peroration," but to me they seem not so much parts as species of perorations, for the very terms (epilogos) and peroratio show, clearly enough, that the conclusion of a speech is implied.
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