Partition of our matter generally useful, § 1-3. When it should be omitted, 4-9. Examples from Cicero, 10-12. As to states of conjecture and quality, 13-17. Artifices that may be used, 18-21. Utility of partition, and the proper qualities of it, 22-28. 1. PARTITION is the enumeration, according to their order, of our own propositions or those of our adversary, or both. Some think that we should always make an enumeration because, by its aid, the cause is rendered clearer and the judge more observant and attentive, if he knows exactly on what point we are speaking and on what points we intend to speak afterwards. 2. Some, on the other hand, think it dangerous to a speaker, for two reasons: that some things, on which we promise to speak, may escape our memory, and others, which we may have omitted in our specification, may occur to us. But nothing of this kind can happen except to one who is utterly deficient in ability or one who brings to his pleading nothing settled or premeditated. 3. Otherwise, what method is so plain and clear as that of a proper division of our matter? For it follows nature as a guide, so as to be the greatest aid to the memory, to prevent us from straying from our proposed course in speaking. I cannot, therefore, agree with those who think that our partition should not exceed three propositions. Doubtless, if it be too multifarious, it will escape the recollection of the judge and perplex his attention, but it is not to be confined, as by a law, to this or that number, when a cause may possibly require more. 4. There are other reasons why we should not always adopt a partition, first, because most observations please better when they appear to be conceived on the moment, and not to be brought from home, but to spring from the subject itself as we are discussing it. Hence the common expressions, "I had almost forgotten," "It had escaped me," "You aptly remind me," are by no means ill received. If you lay down your course of proof beforehand, all pleasure of novelty is cut off from the sequel of your speech. 5. Sometimes, too, the judge must be misled and wrought upon by various artifices, that he may suppose something else to be intended than what is really our object. A proposition is sometimes startling, and a judge, if he sees it prematurely, dreads it as a patient dreads the surgeon's instrument before an operation is performed. But if, without any proposition being advanced beforehand, our observations come upon him when off his guard and penetrate his mind, without any warning, when wrapt up, as it were, in itself, they will make him believe that which he would have distrusted if we had advanced it at first. 6. Occasionally, too, we should avoid not only the distinction of questions, but the mention of them altogether. The judge should have his feelings strongly moved and his attention diverted, for to instruct is not the only duty of an orator; the power of eloquence is best shown in producing excitement. But what is directly opposed to such an effect is a minute carefulness in division, scrupulously separated into parts, at a time when we should endeavor to deprive the judge of the power of deciding against us. 7. Are not arguments, also, that are light and weak when detached, often of great force in a body? Such arguments, accordingly, should rather be collected in a mass, and we should make a sally with them, as it were, upon the judge, an expedient which should rarely, however, be adopted and only in case of necessity, when reasoning forces us to that which seems contrary to reasoning. 8. In addition, it is to be considered that there is, in every division of a case, some one point of more importance than the rest, and when the judge has become acquainted with it, he is apt to disdain other points as requiring no notice. Consequently, if more charges than one are to be established or overthrown, a partition is both advantageous and agreeable, in order that what we have to say on each head may distinctly be shown; but if we have to combat one charge by various arguments, it is needless 9. Thus, if you should make such a division as this, "I shall show that the accused, for whom I plead, is not of such a character that he can be thought to have committed murder; I shall show that he had no motive for committing murder; I shall show that at the time the murder was committed he was beyond the sea," all that you might prove before that which you place last must necessarily appear useless, 10. for the judge is anxious to come to the strongest point of all. If he is of a patient temper, he will silently hold the advocate bound to adhere to his stated division, or, if he be pressed with business, or be a man of some dignity, or of rude manners, will call upon him, with some reproachful remark, to adhere to it. 11. Some have been found, accordingly, to disapprove of Cicero's partition in his speech for Cluentius, where he promises, first of all, that he will show that "no man was ever brought to judgment for, greater crimes, or on stronger evidence, than Oppianicus; next, that the preliminary inquiries were conducted by those very judges by whom he was condemned; lastly, that the judgment was influenced by money, not on the side of Cluentius, but by the opposite party," such a division being needless because, if the third point could be proved, there was no necessity for introducing the first or second. 12. On the other hand, no one will be so unjust or foolish as not to admit that Cicero adopted an excellent division in his pleading for Muraena: "I perceive, judges, that of the whole accusation there are three heads, one concerned with censure of my client's morals, another with his competition for honors, and a third with charges against him for bribery," for he thus exhibits the cause with the utmost clearness and does not render one head useless by another. 13. Most writers also hesitate respecting the following mode of defense: "If I killed the man, I killed him justly; but I did not kill him," for "to what purpose," it is asked "is the first proposition, if the second can be proved? They are at variance with one another, and while we advance both, credit is given to neither." This is indeed partly true, as we ought to rest on the second only, provided it be incontrovertible. 14. But if we have any apprehension as to the stronger, we may very well use the support of both, for different judges are moved by different arguments, and he who believes that the deed was done, may think it just, while he who will not allow it to be just will perhaps feel convinced that it was not done. An unerring hand may be content with one javelin, but by an uncertain hand, several should be thrown, in order that chance may have its influence. 15. Cicero, in defending Milo, shows admirably, in the first place, that Clodius set the ambush, and then adds, superabundantly as it were, that even if he had not done so, a citizen of such a character might have been slain with great merit and honor on the part of the slayer. 16. Yet I would not altogether condemn that order which I just now mentioned, because some arguments, though hard in themselves, may yet be of use to soften others that are to follow. The common saying, that "we must ask more than what is just in order to get what is just" is not without foundation in reason. 17. No one, however, is to take it in such a sense as to suppose that everything may be attempted, for the Greeks very wisely instruct us that what cannot be accomplished ought not to be tried. But whenever we adopt that double mode of defense of which I am speaking, we ought to make it our object to draw from the first head confirmation for the second, for he who might even have confessed without danger may appear to have no motive for speaking falsely when he denies. 18. We must also take good care, whenever we suspect that the judge desires some other proof than that which we are advancing, to promise that we will fully and speedily afford him satisfaction on the point, especially if it affects our client's honor. 19. But it frequently happens that a cause, in itself far from honorable, is supported by the letter of the law. In this case, so that the judges may not listen with unwillingness or disapprobation, they must be often reminded that the vindication of the integrity and honor of our client will follow, that they have but to wait a little and allow us to proceed in order. 20. We may pretend also, occasionally, to say some things against the wish of our client, as Cicero does in his speech for Cluentius, in regard to the law respecting the duties of judges. Sometimes we may stop, as if we were interrupted by our client, and sometimes we may address ourselves to him and entreat him to allow us to take our own course. 21. Thus we shall gradually make an impression on the mind of the judge, who, while he trusts that the honor of our client is going to be vindicated, will listen with less reluctance to our more startling arguments; when he has received some impression from these, the maintenance of our client's honor will be the easier for us. Thus the two points will support each other, and the judge, trusting to our vindication of character, will be more attentive to the point of law and, the point of law being established, will be more disposed to listen to our vindication of character. 22. But though partition is not always necessary or even advantageous, yet, when it is seasonably adopted, it contributes great lucidity and agreeableness to a speech, for it not only causes what is stated to become clearer, by drawing certain particulars out of the crowd, as it were, and placing them full in the sight of the judges, but relieves the attention by fixing a definite termination to certain parts, as distances on a road, marked by inscribed stones, appear greatly to diminish the fatigue of travelers. 23. For it is a gratification to learn the measure of the labor which we have acomplished, and to know how much remains encourages us to proceed with greater spirit to the conclusion; nothing, indeed, need seem long when it is understood where the end is. 24. It was not without justice that Quintus Hortensius gained great praise for his exactness in division, though Cicero sometimes gently laughs at his partitions as being counted upon his fingers, for, as there is moderation requisite in gesture, so we should, even with greater reason, avoid a too precise and, as it were, jointed division of our matter. 25. Minute sections, which, instead of being members, are bits, detract greatly from the weight of a speech, and those who are eager for the praise of such distinction are apt, that they may be thought to have made nice and numerous divisions, to introduce what is wholly superfluous and to cut asunder what is naturally united. They make their parts, not so much more in number, as less in bulk and, after a thousand partitions, fall into that very obscurity against which partition was invented. 26. The proposition of a cause, whether divided or single, ought, whenever it can be introduced with advantage, to be, above all, plain and clear (for what can be more disgraceful than to make that obscure which is adopted for no other purpose than that other parts may not be obscure?). It should also be brief and not loaded even with a single useless word, for we must remember that we have not to show what we are saying, but what we are going to say. 27. We must be cautious, too, that nothing may be deficient in it and nothing redundant. The most frequent cause of redundancy is, when we divide into species what it would be sufficient to divide into genera, or when, after mentioning the genus, we add species to it, as if we should speak of virtue, justice, and temperance, when justice and temperance are but species of virtue. 28. The first step in partition is to distinguish what is admitted and what is disputed. Next, in regard to what is admitted, to distinguish what our adversary admits and what we admit, and in respect to what is disputed, to specify our propositions and those of our opponent. But what is most culpable is not to treat of your several points in the order in which you have arranged them.
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