Quintilian's Institutes of Oratory
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Book 3 - Chapter 5

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Division into things and words; other divisions, § 1-3. Questions concerning what is written and what is not written, 4. Definite and indefinite questions, 5-7. Species of indefinite ones, 8-11. Questions on general subjects not useless, 12-16. Definition of a cause, 17, 18.

1. BUT every speech consists at once of that which is expressed and of that which expresses, that is, of matter and words. Ability in speaking is produced by nature, art, and practice, to which some add a fourth requisite, namely imitation, which I include under art. 2. There are also three objects which an orator must accomplish: to inform, to move, to please. This is a clearer partition than that of those who divide the whole of oratory into what concerns things and passions, since both these will not always find a place in the subjects of which we shall have to treat. Some subjects are altogether unconnected with the pathetic, which, though it cannot make room for itself everywhere, yet, wherever it forces an entrance, produces a most powerful effect.

3. The most eminent authors are of opinion that there are some things in pleading that require proof and others that do not require it, and I agree with them. Some, however, as Celsus, think that an orator will not speak on any subject unless there be some question about it. But the majority of authors, as well as the general division of oratory into three kinds, are opposed to him, unless we say that to praise what is acknowledged to be honorable, and to blame what is admitted to be dishonorable is no part of an orator's business.

4. All writers admit, however, that questions depend on what is written or what is not written. Questions about something written concern legality, those about something not written concern fact. Hermagoras and those who follow him call the former kind legal questions, the latter rational questions, using the terms νομικόν (nomikon) and λογικόν (logikon). 5. Those who make all questions relate to things and words are of the same opinion.

It is also agreed that questions are either indefinite or definite. The indefinite are those which, without regard to persons, time, place, and other such circumstances, are argued for or against. This sort of questions the Greeks call θέσεις (theseis); Cicero propositions; others "general questions relating to civil affairs"; others "questions suitable for philosophical discussion"; while Athenaeus makes them "parts of the cause to be decided." 6. Cicero distinguishes them into questions relating to knowledge and to action, so that "Is the world governed by divine providence?" will be a question of knowledge, "Ought we to take part in the management of public affairs?" a question of action. The former kind he subdivides into three species: "whether a thing is," "what it is," and "of what nature it is," for all these points may be unknown. The latter kind he divides into two: "how we should obtain the thing in question" and "how we should use it."

7. Definite questions embrace particular circumstances, persons, times, and other things; they are called by the Greeks ὑποθέσεις (hypotheseis); by our countrymen, "causes." In these the whole inquiry seems to be about things and persons. 8. The indefinite is always the more comprehensive, for from it comes the definite. To make this plainer by an example, the question "whether a man should marry" is indefinite, the question "whether Cato should marry" is definite, and may accordingly become the subject of a suasory speech. But even those which have no allusion to particular persons are generally referred to something, for "ought we to take a share in the government of our country?" is an abstract question, but "ought we to take a share in the government of it under a tyranny?" has reference to something definite. 9. Yet here also there lies concealed, as it were, a person, for the word "tyranny" doubles the question, and there is a tacit consideration of time and quality; yet you cannot properly call the question a cause.

Those questions which I call indefinite are also called general, and if this be a proper term, definite questions will also be special. But in every special question is included the general, as being antecedent. 10. In judicial causes, too, I know not whether whatever comes under the question of quality is not general: Milo killed Clodius: "He was in the right to kill a lier-in-wait": does not this question arise, "Whether it be right to kill a lier-in-wait?" In conjectural matters, also, are not these questions general, "was hatred, or covetousness, the cause of the crime? Ought we to trust to evidence extracted by torture? Ought greater credit to be given to witnesses or to arguments?" As to definitions, it is certain that everything comprehended in them is expressed generally.

11. Some think that those questions which are limited to particular persons and causes may sometimes be called theses, if only put in a different way, so that, when "Orestes is accused," it is a cause, but when it is inquired "Was Orestes justly acquitted?" it is a thesis. Of this sort is also the question "Was Cato right in giving Marcia to Hortensius?" These writers distinguish a thesis from a cause by saying that a thesis has respect to what is theoretical, a cause to what is actually done, since in regard to a thesis, we dispute only with a view to abstract truth, but in a cause, we consider some particular act.

12. Some, however, think that the consideration of general questions is useless to an orator, as it is of no profit for it to be proved, they say, that we ought to marry or that we should take part in the government of the state, if we are hindered from doing so by age or ill health. But we cannot make the same objection to all questions of the kind, as, for example, to these: whether virtue is the chief good, and whether the world is governed by divine providence. 13. Moreover, in inquiries that relate to an individual, though it is not enough to consider the general question, yet we cannot arrive at the decision of the particular point without discussing the general question first. For how will Cato consider whether he himself ought to marry, unless it be first settled whether men ought to marry at all? Or how will it be inquired whether Cato ought to marry Marcia, if it be not previously decided whether Cato ought to take a wife? 14. Yet there are books in circulation under the name of Hermagoras which support the opinion that I am opposing, but either the title is fictitious or it was another Hermagoras that wrote them. For how can they be the productions of the same Hermagoras who wrote so much and so admirably on this art, when, as is evident, even from Cicero's first book on rhetoric, he divided the subject matter of oratory into theses and causes? There, Cicero condemns this division, contending that the thesis is no concern of the orator's, and referring this kind of question wholly to the philosophers. 15. But Cicero has relieved me from all shame at differing with him, as he not only censures those books himself, but also, in his Orator, in the books which he wrote De Oratore, and in his Topica, directs us to abstract the discussion from particular persons and occasions, because we can speak more fully on what is general than what is special, and because whatever is proved universally must also be proved particularly. 16. As to the state of the question, it is the same with regard to every kind of thesis as with regard to causes. To this is added that there are some questions that concern matters absolutely, and others that refer to something particular; of the former kind is whether a man ought to marry; of the latter, whether an old man ought to marry; of the former kind, is whether a man be brave; of the latter, whether he be braver than another man.

17. Apollodorus, to adopt the translation of his disciple Valgius, defines a cause thus: The cause is the matter having regard in all its parts to the question, or, the cause is the matter of which the question is the object. He then gives this definition of the matter: The matter is the combination of persons, places, times, motives, means, incidents, acts, instruments, sayings, things written and not written. 18. For my part, I here understand by the "cause" what the Greeks call ὑποθέσις (hypothesis), by the "matter" what they term περίστασις (peristasis). But some writers have defined the cause itself in the same way as Apollodorus defines the matter. Isocrates says that a cause is a definite question relating to civil affairs, or a disputed point between a definite number of persons. Cicero speaks of it in these words: A cause is determined by reference to certain persons, places, times, actions, and events, depending for decision either on all or the majority of them.


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Lee Honeycutt (honeycuttlee@gmail.com) Last modified:1/15/07
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